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ABSTRACT. Existing war powers scholarship focuses overwhelmingly on the President's
power to initiate military operations abroad and the extent to which that power is constrained by
Congress. It ignores the allocation of legal power to threaten military force or war, even though
threats - to coerce or deter enemies and to reassure allies - are one of the most important ways in
which the United States government wields its military might. This paper fills that scholarly
void, and draws on recent political science and historical scholarship to construct a richer and
more accurate account of the modern presidency's powers to shape American security policy.
The swelling scope of the President's practice in wielding threatened force largely tracks
the standard historical narrative of war powers shifting from Congress to the President. Indeed,
adding threats of force to that story might suggest that this shift in powers of war and peace has
been even more dramatic than usually supposed. This Article shows, however, that congressional
influence operates more robustly-and in different ways -than usually supposed in legal debates
about war powers to shape strategic decision-making. In turn, these mechanisms of
congressional influence can enhance the potency of threatened force.
By refocusing the debate on threatened force and its credibility requirements, this Article
also calls into question many orthodoxies of the policy advantages and risks attendant to various
allocations of legal war powers. Instead of proposing a policy-optimal solution, the Article
concludes that the allocation of constitutional war powers is-and should be - geopolitically and
strategically contingent. The actual and effective balance between presidential and congressional
powers over war and peace in practice necessarily depends on shifting assumptions and policy
choices about how best to secure U.S. interests against potential threats.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2012, at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's
prodding, American policymakers and commentators argued intensely about
whether the President of the United States should draw a "red line" for Iranian
leaders-a threshold of nuclear weapon development the crossing of which
would trigger a U.S. military response.' It is easy to imagine that the actual
launching of military attacks against Iran would generate intense scrutiny and
argument of constitutional issues, most notably whether the President could
take such action without congressional authorization. Were military strikes to
carry on for months, it is also easy to imagine significant legal discussion of
whether the President could continue them, in light of the War Powers
Resolution's sixty-day limit on military engagements without express
congressional approval.' Nobody seriously questioned, though, that as a
constitutional matter, the President could unilaterally draw the red line
threatening them.3
1. See Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, Obama Rebuffs Netanyahu on Setting Limits on Iran's
Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.con/2o12/o9/14/world
/middleeast/obama-rebuffs-netanyahu-on-nuclear-red-line-for-iran.html.
More recently, debate has swirled around President Obama's drawing of a red line with
regard to the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons, and whether in doing so the
President put U.S. credibility at risk. See Peter Baker et al., Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put U.S.
in Bind on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol3/o5/o5/world
/middleeast/obamas-vow-on-chemical-weapons-puts-him-in-tough-spot.html. In June
2013, the President moved some U.S. military forces to Jordan as an implicit threat of
military force against Syria. See Michael R. Gordon & Thom Shanker, U.S. to Keep
Warplanes in Jordan, Pressing Syria, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2oi3/o6/6/world/europe/russia-faults-proof-of-use-of-chemicals-in-syrian-war.html.
In August 2013, following the Syrian government's major chemical weapons attack
against opponents and civilians, President Obama announced his intention to strike Syrian
government targets with military force. See Remarks on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY
COMp. PREs. Doc. 596 (Aug. 31, 2013). Surprisingly, he also announced that,
notwithstanding his view that he had unilateral constitutional authority to take that action,
he would seek congressional approval to do so. See id.
I discuss the arguments of this Article in relation to the Syria case in Matthew C.
Waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 297
(2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2ol3/11/7/waxman.htnil.
2. So U.S.C. § i544(b) (20o6).
3. Cf Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military
Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 69 (1995) ("[E]vents (surrounding the 1994 Haiti
invasion] raise the important question whether the President can legitimately 'threaten'
force when he is not yet in a proper constitutional posture to carry out the threat in full.").
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The implicit consensus that the President is constitutionally empowered to
threaten military force in this situation is, in my view, correct. But the
consensus presents an anomaly. Proponents of drawing a line argued that
doing so would prevent a war (or at least a bigger and more destructive war)
down the road,4 while critics argued that it would needlessly provoke or drag
the United States into a wars -the very sorts of concerns that usually animate
strident war powers debates. More generally, legal scholars consider the
allocation of constitutional war powers to be of paramount importance because
it could affect whether or when the United States goes to war, and because it
implicates core questions about how our democracy should decide matters of
such consequence." Yet legal discourse in this area excludes almost completely
some central ways in which the United States actually wields its military
power, namely, with threats ofwar orforce. This Article breaks down that barrier
and connects the legal issues with the strategic ones.
As to the constitutional issues, there is wide agreement among legal
scholars on the general historical saga of American war powers-by which I
mean the authority to use military force, and not the specific means or tactics
by which war is waged once initiated.7 Generally speaking, the story goes like
this: The Founders placed decisions whether to engage in active military
hostilities in Congress's hands, and Presidents mostly (but not always)
4. See, e.g., Michael Oren, Op-Ed., Should Israel Have a Red Line on Iran?, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 9,
2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/lo/o8/israel-red-line-iran-lesses-chances
-conflict/KLJSeZxodRN8tDmDCDztAI/story.html.
5. See Fareed Zakaria, 'Red Line' Folly, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2012, http://articles
.washingtonpost.con/2o2-09-12/opinions/35495153jIdefense-minister-ehud-barak-israeli
-strike-haaretz. On the difficulties of coercive diplomacy in the Iran case, see generally
Robert Jervis, Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 1o5.
6. See William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. L.J. 1333, 1333
(2006) ("Few areas of constitutional law have produced as much heated debate as the war
powers area, heat produced in no small part by the passionate belief that this is a subject of
incalculable consequence."). As Justice Story wrote in 1833: "[T]he power of declaring war
... is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost
deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the nation." 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES S 1166 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833).
7. For a discussion of the latter, see generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander-in-Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REv. 689 (2008) (discussing theories of the scope of this power
and Congress's power to restrict it).
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respected this allocation for the first century and a half of our history.' At least
by the Cold War, however, Presidents began exercising this power unilaterally
in a much wider set of cases, and Congress mostly allowed them to do so.9
Congress's attempt to realign this power allocation after the Vietnam War
failed.'o Today, the President has a very free hand in using military force that
does not rise to the level of "war" in the constitutional sense -that is, force not
rising to large-scale and long-duration uses of ground troops. From a
functional standpoint, this dramatic shift in constitutional power is seen as
either good, because decisions to use force require policy dexterity inherent in
the presidency, or bad, because unilateral presidential decisions to use force are
more prone to be dangerously rash than those checked by Congress."
With this story and split in resulting views in mind, lawyers and legal
scholars continue to debate a series of familiar constitutional questions. Does
the historical gloss of practice among the political branches-the patterns of
behavior by the President and Congress with respect to using force-provide
legal justification for this shift toward executive power? Without requiring
congressional authorization before engaging in hostilities, are there sufficient
checks on executive action? Does this shift in power lead the United States into
needless and costly wars, and if so, should this result be remedied with more
potent checks, whether led by Congress or courts, to reestablish a
constitutional formula closer to the original one?
The main data set for analyzing these questions is, not surprisingly, actual
wars and other hostile engagements of U.S. forces abroad. In ascertaining and
8. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFTERMATH 3-10 (1993); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1-26
(1973); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972). But see John C. Yoo, The Continuation ofPolitics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 167 (1996) (arguing that an original
understanding of the Constitution supports very broad presidential authority to use force).
William Michael Treanor summarizes this debate, including scholarship that challenges the
assumption that the Founders intended to deny the President significant power to use force.
William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L.
REv. 695, 706-13 (1997).
9. Some trace the major shift to the McKinley administration and the vastly expanded U.S.
power projection that followed the Spanish-American War around the turn of the twentieth
century. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 88-89 (1990); David Gartner, Foreign Relations,
Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. REv. 499, 509-16 (2012).
1o. On Congress's failed effort to modify this power allocation using the War Powers
Resolution, see MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 87-111 (1990).
11. See generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-51 (2013).
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describing the patterns of executive behavior and congressional responses, legal
scholars look at armed conflicts and combat operations of the past. Legal
debates heat up during or following wars, especially major ones that go badly,
or military combat that extends longer than expected. Proposed solutions focus
on the commencement of armed hostilities - military engagement with the
enemy - and what, if any, inter-branch actions must precede or accompany it.
There is a major disconnect here, though, between legal scholarship on
constitutional war powers - specifically, its predominant focus on actual
military engagements - and the way the United States wields its military
might, especially since the onset of the Cold War and extending into the
twenty-first century. Oftentimes the most important policy tool derived from
U.S. military power is not waging war, but threatening war or force. The
power to threaten war is closely related to, but analytically distinct from, the
power to make it.
By "threats" in this Article, I mean communications of the will and
capability to use military force that are employed as a means to induce other
actors to change behavior -whether to do something or to not do something.1 2
During major periods of American history, including the present one, U.S.
strategy has relied heavily on perceptions of U.S. military might and
willingness to use it; that is, it has relied on the manipulation of risk to deter
aggression or other actions by adversaries, to coerce or compel certain actions
by other states or international actors, to reassure allies, and to pursue other
political designs in the shadow of armed threats.13 The primary purpose to
which U.S. military might has been directed since World War II has generally
been to prevent wars or deter them. When war or large-scale force was actually
used, it was because a prior policy or strategy had failed -for instance, threats
were insufficiently credible, crises involving U.S. threats of force escalated in
ways difficult to control, and so on -rather than because making war was
intended as the best approach to a danger or, sometimes, even recognized as a
likely result. In this regard, most of the time that U.S. military power is
"used" - and often when it is most successful -it does not manifest as a war or
major military engagement at all.
There is a basic paradox at work here: if threats of force work, force does
not have to be used. Other things being equal, the greater the credibility of the
threat, the less likely it will be necessary to make good on it. Because this
argument is about wars that don't happen, though, it is difficult to develop
12. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing different types of threats).
13. See infra Section I.C.
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empirical evidence to support it. Accordingly, statesmen cannot be so sure of
its validity and constitutional lawyers tend to overlook it entirely.
There is a close parallel in international law to this disconnect between legal
discourse and security strategy. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."14 However, beyond prohibiting the most blatantly
aggressive threats, international legal doctrine in this area is not at all well
developed, 5 and the regulation of threats of force is not well theorized in
international legal scholarship. 6 As with the domestic law of American war
powers, the threat element has mostly disappeared from discussion, even
though international relations scholars recognize that threatened force is doing
so much work. 7
This Article is not a doctrinal argument. It is an argument about framing
and method, intended to fill an analytical gap and therefore to inform
understanding of the functional advantages and disadvantages of legal
formulas for allocating war powers.8
Specifically, Part I of this Article contends that understanding the evolution
in constitutional war powers and the merits or dangers of these developments
requires both widening the data set and investigative lens to include threats of
force and incorporating the insights of the past several decades of analysis by
political scientists, historians, and theorists of American grand strategy. Doing
so reveals aspects of the war powers story obscured by legal discourse and
method focused predominantly on actual uses of force, and it alters and refines
the orthodox functional arguments usually relied on by both sides -
presidentialist (favoring vast unilateral executive authority to use force) and
congressionalist (favoring tight legislative checks on that authority) -of the
war powers debate. In game-theoretic terms, the debate between presidentialist
14. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
1s. See Romana Sadurska, Threats ofForce, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1988) (discussing the minimal
prohibitions and major areas of uncertainty of the "threats" element in Article 2(4)).
16. See Marco Roscini, Threats ofArmed Force and Contemporary International Law, 2007 NETH.
INT'L L. REv. 229, 231-32 (discussing the dearth of such scholarship).
17. For additional discussion of the relationship between international legal doctrine and
threatened force, see Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of
the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151, 184-86 (2013).
is. This Article does not address other modes of constitutional interpretation-such as
originalism or textualism-for interpreting constitutional war powers. My intention in
putting them aside is not to reject those other interpretive modes but simply to focus on,
critique, and refine functional or policy arguments.
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and congressionalist legal scholars about functional advantages looks only at
the final stage of a decision tree; but the President's ability to threaten force is
critically important at earlier stages in determining whether that final stage will
occur at all, as well as the payoffs associated with choices.' 9
Part II draws on several strands of political science literature to illuminate
the relationship between war powers law and threats of force. As a descriptive
matter, the swelling scope of the President's practice in wielding threatened
force largely tracks the standard historical narrative of war powers shifting
from Congress to the President. Indeed, adding threats of force to that story
might suggest that this shift in powers of war and peace has been even more
dramatic than is usually supposed, at least in terms of how formal
congressional checks are exercised.
Part II also shows, however, that congressional influence operates more
robustly - and in different ways - than usually supposed in legal debates about
war powers to shape strategic decision-making. It also shows that these
mechanisms of congressional influence can enhance the potency of threats.
This Article thus fits into a broader scholarly debate now raging about the
extent to which the modern President is meaningfully constrained by law, and
in what ways.2 o Recent political science scholarship suggests that Congress
already exerts constraining influences on presidential decisions to threaten
force, even without resorting to binding legislative actions." Moreover,
credibility of signals is critical to effective threats of force. Whereas it often
used to be assumed that institutional checks on executive discretion
undermined democracies' ability to threaten military force credibly, some
recent political science scholarship also offers reasons to expect that
congressional constraints can actually bolster the credibility of U.S. threats.22
As a prescriptive matter, Part II also shows that examining threatened force
and the credibility requirements for its effectiveness calls into question-and
may ultimately upend-many orthodoxies concerning the policy advantages
and risks attendant to various allocations of legal war powers, including
proposed reforms.23 Although the President faces no significant and direct legal
ig. Cf Marc Trachtenberg, History Teaches, YALE J. INT'L AFF., Sept. 2012, at 23, 29-30 (arguing
that armed conflict should be viewed as an "outcome of a political process, unfolding over
time").
20. See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Section II.A.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Section II.C; see also Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional
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limits on his power to threaten force, the President's flexibility to later use force
indirectly affects decision-making about threatening it, with major
implications for securing peace or dragging the United States into conflicts.
Moreover, allocations of legal powers affect potential conflicts not only because
they may constrain U.S. actions but also because they may send signals and
shape other states' (including adversaries') expectations of U.S. actions. That
is, most analysis of war powers is inward-looking, focused on audiences
internal to the U.S. government and polity, but thinking about threatened
force prompts us to look outward, at how law affects external perceptions
among adversaries and allies. Here, extant political science and studies of
American strategy offer few clear conclusions, but they point the way toward
more sophisticated and realistic policy assessment of legal doctrine and
proposed reform.
More generally, as explained in Part III, analysis of threatened force and
war powers exposes an underappreciated relationship between constitutional
doctrine and grand strategy. Instead of proposing a permanent, functionally
optimal allocation of legal powers, as legal scholars are often tempted to do,
this Article in the end denies the tenability of any such claim. Having identified
new spaces of war and peace powers that legal scholars need to take account of
in understanding how those powers are really exercised, this Article also
highlights the extent to which any normative account of the proper
distribution of authority over this area depends on many matters that cannot
be predicted in advance or expected to remain constant." It concludes that the
allocation of constitutional war powers is - and should be - geopolitically and
strategically contingent. The actual and effective balance between presidential
and congressional powers over war and peace in practice necessarily depends
on shifting assumptions and policy choices about how best to secure U.S.
interests against potential threats."
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2516-38 (2006) (discussing the standard functional accounts of
war powers doctrine and suggesting the need to incorporate signaling effects on
adversaries).
24. On the relationship between domestic constraints and international bargaining more
broadly, see generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988). For a similar discussion in the security crisis context,
see Alastair Smith, International Crises and Domestic Politics, 92 AM. POL. SC. REv. 623
(1998).
25. See infra Section III.A.
26. See infra Section III.B.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWERS AND THREATS OF FORCE
Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are
immensely and uniquely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates about
constitutional war powers occupy so much attention. But one of the most
common and important ways that the United States uses its military power is
by threatening war or force - to coerce, to deter, to bargain, to reassure - and
the constitutional dimensions of that activity have received almost no scrutiny
or even theoretical investigation.
By "threatening" force or war I mean communicating the possible future
use of armed violence to affect the behavior of other actors, usually other states.
Such threats involve the perceptions of violence to come. 7 I exclude from this
discussion threats to impose other types of costs - such as economic or
diplomatic sanctions -for reasons discussed below." I include the wide range
from threats of very limited force to threats of full-scale war because legal
scholars often group them together in their own functional arguments about
constitutional powers, and many of my own arguments similarly apply across
the spectrum. Limited uses of force can also grow into big wars, and big wars
can sometimes be averted with threats backed up by very limited applications
of force.29 Such threats are an important and pervasive feature of U.S. foreign
policy but attract virtually no legal discussion at all.
A. War Powers Doctrine and Debates
The Constitution grants Congress the powers to create military forces and
to "declare War,"30 which the Supreme Court early on made clear includes the
power to authorize limited uses of force short of full-blown war.3' The
Constitution then vests the President with executive power and designates him
27. For a discussion of different types of threats, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
28. In short, legal scholars often treat military action as of special constitutional concern but fail
particularly in this context to incorporate strategic context and logic. See infra Section III.B.
29. I focus only on threats before an armed conflict is already underway, though even in the
midst of war, the continuing threat of further violence yet to come is also usually intended
to cause the other side to concede.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
31. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,
40-41,43, 45 (18oo).
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Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.32 It has been well accepted since the
Founding that these powers include unilateral authority to repel invasions if
the United States is attacked.33
Although there is nearly universal acceptance of these basic starting points,
there is little legal agreement about how the Constitution allocates
responsibility for the vast bulk of cases in which the United States has actually
resorted to force. The United States has declared war or been invaded only a
handful of times in its history, but it has used force-sometimes large-scale
force-hundreds of other times.34 Views are split over questions like when, if
ever, the President may use force to deal with aggression against third parties,
and how much unilateral discretion the President has to use limited force short
of full-blown war. For many lawyers and legal scholars, at least one important
methodological tool for resolving such questions is to look at historical
practice, and especially the extent to which the political branches acquiesced in
common practices.3s
Interpretation of that historical practice for constitutional purposes again
divides legal scholars, but most would agree at least descriptively on some basic
features of the history. In particular, most scholars agree that from the
Founding era through World War II, Presidents and Congresses alike
recognized through their behavior and statements that, except in certain
narrow types of contingencies, congressional authorization was required for
large-scale military operations against other states and international actors,
even as many Presidents pushed and sometimes crossed those boundaries.3'
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2.
33. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 3-5. This power to repel attacks was most famously
recognized by the Supreme Court in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) ("If a
war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound
to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority.").
34. See BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF USE OF
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2013 (2013).
3s. On the importance of historical practice in ascertaining constitutional war powers, see
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARv. L. REV. 411, 461-68 (2012); and Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War
Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, io6 YALE L.J. 845, 873 (1996) (reviewing Louis
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)).
36. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 8, at 3; Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 17-80 (2d ed.
2004); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR
POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989); Lofgren, supra note 8.
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Whatever constitutional constraints on presidential use of force existed
prior to World War II, however, most scholars also note that the President
asserted much more extensive unilateral powers to use force during and after
the Cold War, and many trace the turning point to the Korean War.37 Congress
did not declare war in that instance, nor did it expressly authorize U.S.
participation.3' From that period forward, Presidents have asserted broad
unilateral authority to use force to address threats to U.S. interests, including
threats to U.S. allies, and neither Congress nor the courts have managed to roll
back this expanding power.39
Congressional concern with expansive presidential war-making authority
spiked during the Vietnam War. In the wind-down of that conflict, Congress
passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto. 4o Its stated
purpose was to defend the Framers' original constitutional vision: that the
"collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations."4' Since then, presidentialists have argued that the President still
retains expansive authority to use force abroad to protect American interests,42
and congressionalists argue that this authority is tightly circumscribed. 43
37. See GRIFFIN, supra note ii, at 32; SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 135; see also WORMUTH &
FIRMAGE, supra note 36, at 28 ("Until 1950, no judge, no President, no legislator, no
commentator ever suggested that the President had legal authority to initiate war.").
38. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 130-40.
39. See W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POwERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS
THE ARROWS AND OLVE BRANCH? 192-95 (1981); Stromseth, supra note 35, at 846-47.
40. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (20o6)).
41. So U.S.C. S 1541(a).
42. There is a further divide here between those who argue that the War Powers Resolution
implicitly contemplates broad presidential discretion, see Walter Dellinger, After the Cold
War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 5o U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 110 (1995),
and those who argue that the President is constitutionally free to ignore the statute, see
Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful,
17 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 683, 684 (1984); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse ofHistory in the
War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1169,1178-79 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Lilrya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of Louis Fisher, Scholar in Residence, Constitution Project),
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fisher-Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Lilrya
and War Powers Hearing].
1637
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
These constitutional debates have continued into the twenty-first century.
Constitutional scholars split, for example, over President Obama's power to
involve the United States in coalition operations against Libya without
congressional authorization in 2011, especially after the War Powers
Resolution's sixty-day clock expired."4 Some argue that President Obama's use
of military force without specific congressional authorization in that case
reflects the broad constitutional discretion Presidents now have to protect
American interests, at least short of full-blown "war," while others argue that it
is the latest in a long record of presidential violations of the Constitution and
the War Powers Resolution.4s
B. Threats ofForce and Constitutional Powers
These days it is usually taken for granted that -whether or not he can make
war unilaterally -the President is constitutionally empowered to threaten the
use of force, implicitly or explicitly, through diplomatic means or shows of
force. Nobody seriously questions the President's power to declare that the
United States is contemplating military options in response to a crisis, or the
President's power to move substantial U.S. military forces to a crisis region or
engage in military exercises there.
To take the Libya example just mentioned, is there any constitutional
limitation on the President's authority to move U.S. military forces to the
Mediterranean region and visibly prepare them to strike?4' What about his
authority to issue an ultimatum to Libyan leaders that they cease their brutal
conduct or face military action? Would it matter whether such threats were
explicit versus implicit, whether they were open and public versus secret, or
44. Compare Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, The Constitutional Clock Is Ticking on Obama's
War, FoREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2o11/o4/o6/the
constitutionalclockis ticking-on-obamas-war (warning of legal barriers to continuing
operations and describing modern presidential discretion to unilaterally launch military
actions as "a fundamental breach with constitutional tradition"), with Libya and War Powers
Hearing, supra note 43 (statement of Peter J. Spiro, Charles Weiner Professor of Law,
Temple University-Beasley School of Law), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/SpiroTestimony.pdf (defending the legality of Libya operations).
45. See Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of "Empty Words": A Comment on the Justice Department's
Libya Opinion, HARv. NAT'L SECURrrY J., Apr. 14, 201, at 3, http://harvardnsj.org/wp
-content/uploads/2o11/o4/Forum GlennonFinal-Version.pdf.
46. The War Powers Resolution's application to presidential military actions in situations where
hostilities are "imminent," 5o U.S.C. § 1541, might be read to impose statutory restrictions
on some military threats.
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whether they were just a bluff? Even if there is no constitutional obstacle,
might it be argued that the War Powers Resolution's reporting requirements
and limits on operations were triggered by a President's mere ultimatum or
threatening military demonstration, insofar as those moves might constitute a
"situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances"? 4These questions simply are not asked, at least not anymore.*4
If anything, most lawyers would probably conclude that the President's
constitutional powers to threaten war are not just expansive but largely beyond
Congress's authority to regulate directly.
The President's power to threaten force is almost certainly at least as broad
as his power to use it. One way to think about it is that the power to threaten
force is a lesser-included element of presidential war powers; the power to
threaten to use force is simply a secondary question, the answer to which is
bounded by the primary issue of the scope of presidential power to actually use
it. If one interprets the President's defensive war powers very broadly, to
include dealing with aggression against not only U.S. territories but also its
distant interests and allies, 49 then it is easy to conclude that the President can
also therefore take steps that stop short of actual armed intervention to deter or
prevent such aggression. If, however, one interprets the President's powers
narrowly-for example, to include only limited unilateral authority to repel
attacks against U.S. territoryso -then one might extend objections to excessive
presidential power to include the President's unilateral threats of armed
intervention.
47. Id.
48. See Damrosch, supra note 3, at 69 ("Relatively little attention has been directed to problems
of threats of force, as distinct from consummated uses of force, in either constitutional or
international law.").
49. See, e.g., Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam, 54 DEP'T ST. Buu. 474, 484 (1966) (arguing that the President's Article II power
extends to defensive actions undertaken in Vietnam); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d
19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2ooo) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("I read the Prize Cases to stand for the
proposition that the President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third
parties even without specific congressional authorization . . . .").
50. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Basic Principles of the War Power, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 319,
322 (2012); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543,
1623 (2002) ("Among modern academic theories of war power, even the most committed
congressionalists accept the President's independent power over some defensive measures.
At minimum, the President must have the power to 'repel sudden attacks'... ." (quoting 2
THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed., Yale rev. ed.
1937))).
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Another way of looking at it is that, depending on how a particular threat is
communicated, threats of war or force may fall within even quite narrow
interpretations of the President's inherent foreign relations powers to conduct
diplomacy or his express Commander-in-Chief power to control U.S. military
forces-or some combination of the two. A President's verbal warning,
ultimatum, or declared intention to use military force, for instance, could be
justified as merely exercising his role as the "sole organ" of U.S. foreign
diplomacy, conveying externally information about U.S. capabilities and
intentions." A President's movement of U.S. troops or warships to a crisis
region or elevation of their alert level could be justified as merely exercising his
day-to-day tactical control over forces under his command.52 Generally,
nobody seriously argues that the exercise of these powers alone could so affect
the likelihood of hostilities or war as to intrude on Congress's powers over war
and peace.53 But we know from historical examples that such unilateral military
moves, even those that are ostensibly defensive ones, can provoke wars - take,
for example, President Polk's movement of U.S. forces to the contested border
with Mexico in 1846, and the resulting skirmishes that led Congress to declare
war.s4
51. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also Dep't of
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (observing that the Supreme Court has "recognized
'the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the
Executive"' (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981))); Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1591, 1592-93 (2005) (arguing that diplomatic authority is vested in the President);
Phillip R. Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 755 (1989)
(noting that "the President has the exclusive power of official communication with foreign
governments").
52. Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson explained more than seventy years ago that the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief "has long been recognized as extending to the
dispatch of armed forces outside of the United States . . . for the purpose of protecting ...
American interests." Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y
Gen. 58, 62 (1941). At various times, though, Congress has placed statutory geographical
restrictions on the deployment of U.S. forces. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway,
Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis ofPresidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV.
447, 456 (2011).
Note that sometimes discretion to move, deploy, or place on alert U.S. military forces in
threatening ways is delegated below the President in the chain of command, for example, to
the Secretary of Defense or to regional combatant commanders.
53. See Dellinger, supra note 42, at 113-14.
54. See generally AMY S. GREENBERG, A WICKED WAR: POLK, CLAY, LINCOLN, AND THE 1846 U.S.
INVASION OF MEXICO 95-1o8 (2012) (describing U.S. military maneuvers just north of the
Rio Grande and the Mexican military's reaction).
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Coming at the issue from the perspective of Congress's Article I powers
rather than the President's Article II powers, the very phrasing of the power
"To declare War" most naturally puts all the emphasis on the present tense of
U.S. military action, rather than its potentiality. Even as congressionalists
advance interpretations of the Clause to include not merely declarative
authority but primary decision-making authority as to whether or not to wage
war or use force abroad, their modem-day interpretations do not include a
power to threaten war (except perhaps through the specific act of declaring it).
None seriously argues-at least not any more-that the Declare War Clause
precludes presidential threats of war.
In recent decades, only a few prominent legal scholars have addressed the
President's power to threaten force, and only in brief terms. Taylor Reveley
noted in his volume on war powers the importance of allocating constitutional
responsibility not only for the actual use of force but also for "[vierbal or
written threats or assurances about the circumstances in which the United
States will take military action . . . , whether delivered by declarations of
American policy, through formal agreements with foreign entities, by the
demeanor or words of American officials, or by some other sign of national
intent."5 Beyond recognizing the critical importance of threats and measures
short of force in affecting war and peace, however, Reveley made little effort to
address the issue in any detail.
Louis Henkin -one of the few legal scholars who has attempted to define
the limiting doctrinal contours of presidentially threatened force -likewise
offered only a brief treatment of the issue. As he wrote in his monumental
Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution:
Unfortunately, the line between war and lesser uses of force is often
elusive, sometimes illusory, and the use of force for foreign policy
purposes can almost imperceptibly become a national commitment to
war. Even when he does not use military force, the President can incite
other nations or otherwise plunge or stumble this country into war, or
force the hand of Congress to declare or to acquiesce and cooperate in
war. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, however, one can declare
with confidence that a President begins to exceed his authority if he
willfully or recklessly moves the nation towards war .... 56
55. REVELEY, supra note 39, at 16.
56. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101 (2d ed. 1996).
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The implication seems to be that the President may not unilaterally threaten
force in ways that are dramatically escalatory and could likely lead to war, or
perhaps that the President may not threaten the use of force that he does not
have the authority to initiate unilaterally.
Finally, Jefferson Powell -who generally takes a more expansive view than
Henkin of the President's war powers - has argued that "[t] he ability to warn
of, or threaten, the use of military force is an ordinary and essential element in
the toolbox of that branch of government empowered to formulate and
implement foreign policy."7 For Powell, the President is constantly taking
actions as part of everyday international relations that carry a risk of military
escalation, and these are well-accepted as part of the President's broader
authority to manage, if not set, foreign policy.
The paucity of these accounts demonstrates how confined our modern
discussion of presidential powers really is. Moreover, it is not only in academia
that the President's authority to threaten force is so well accepted these days as
to seem self-evident. It is also reflected in the legal debates among and inside
all three branches of government. In 1989, Michael Reisman observed:
Military maneuvers designed to convey commitment to allies or
contingent threats to adversaries . . . are matters of presidential
competence. Congress does not appear to view as within its bailiwick
many low-profile contemporary expressions of gunboat diplomacy, i.e.,
the physical interposition of some U.S. war-making capacity as a
communication to an adversary of United States' intentions and
capacities to oppose it."
This was and remains a correct description but understates the pattern of
practice, insofar as even major and high-profile expressions of coercive
diplomacy are typically regarded among all three branches of government as
solely within presidential responsibility.
In Dellums v. Bush-perhaps the most searching judicial examination of
presidential power to use large-scale force abroad since the end of the Cold
War-the district court dismissed on ripeness grounds a suit by members of
Congress challenging President George H.W. Bush's expected military
operations against Iraq in 1991. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the President
57. H. JEFFERSON POWEIL, THE PRESIDENT'S AuTHoRrrY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 119 (2002).
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from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without first securing explicit
congressional authorization for such action.s9 But the court held that, at the
time of the suit, the President had openly threatened war-through
ultimatums and deployment of several hundred thousand U.S. troops-but
had not yet "commit[ted] to a definitive course of action" to carry out the
threat, so therefore there was no justiciable legal issue.6" The President's threat
of war did not seem to give the district court legal pause at all; quite the
contrary, the mere threat of war was treated by the court as a non-issue
entirely."'
This unquestioned presidential discretion to threaten force or war was not
always the case, however. During the early period of the Republic, there was a
powerful view that beyond the limits on the President's authority with respect
to outright initiation of armed hostilities or declaration of war, more broadly
the President also could not unilaterally take actions that would likely or
directly risk war (putting aside responses to actual military attacks),"2 provoke
a war with another state,6 or change the condition of affairs or relations with
another state along the continuum from peace to war.6 To do so, it was often
argued, would usurp Congress's prerogative to control the nation's state of
peace or war.6s During the Quasi-War with France at the end of the eighteenth
century, for example, some members of Congress openly questioned whether
the President, absent congressional authorization, could take actions that
visibly signaled an intention to retaliate against French maritime harassment, 6
and even some members of President Adams's cabinet shared doubts.6 7
59- 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-52 (D.D.C. 1990).
6o. Id. at 1151-52. The Court also determined the case was not yet ripe because the whole of
Congress had not yet voted on the matter. Id.
61. As for the legislator-plaintiffs, they too challenged not the President's authority to make
threats but the troop build-up on the grounds that this signaled the President's intent to
engage in hostilities in the near future. Id. at 1143-44, 1151; cf Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf
War and the Constitution, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1991, at 84, 85-86 (arguing that deployment
of troops to defend Saudi Arabia after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constitutionally required
congressional action).
62. See DAvID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1829, at
201-02 (2001); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 157 (1976).
63. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 206, 218; SOFAER, supra note 62, at 1ol.
64. See SOFAER, supra note 62, at 154, 157, 165.
65. See Stromseth, supra note 35, at 862.
66. SOFAER, supra note 62, at 157 ("Many legislators contended that the President could use the
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Some controversy about the President's power to threaten force arose
(belatedly) in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, announced in an 1823
presidential address to Congress, which in effect declared to European powers
that the United States would oppose any efforts to colonize or reassert control
in the Western Hemisphere. 68 "Virtually no one questioned [Monroe's
proclamation] at the time. Yet it posed a constitutional difficulty of the first
importance."' Monroe did not actually initiate any military hostilities, but his
implied threat -which lacked congressional approval -risked provoking rather
than deterring European aggression. 70 Moreover, by putting U.S. prestige and
credibility on the line, his threat limited Congress's practical freedom of action
if European powers chose to intervene.71 Monroe's successor, John Quincy
Adams, consequently faced complaints from opposition members of Congress
that Monroe's proclamation had exceeded his constitutional authority and had
usurped Congress's power by committing the United States -even in a non-
binding way- to resisting European meddling in the hemisphere.72
This debate over the President's authority to unilaterally send militarily
threatening signals mirrored an issue raised during the 1793 Neutrality
Controversy: whether President Washington could unilaterally declare the
United States to be neutral as to the war among European powers.
Washington's politically controversial proclamation declaring the nation
"friendly and impartial" in the conflict between France and Great Britain
(along with other European states) famously prompted a back-and-forth
contest of public letters by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, writing
pseudonymously as "Pacificus" and "Helvidius," about whether the President
frigates as he saw fit, so long as he did not change the 'state of things' or act 'offensively'
67. Secretary of War James McHenry told President Adams that he could not "'derive authority
[from the laws] to do more than employ the ships as convoys,' nor to authorize anything
'further than to repel force by force. . . .' Id. at 155 (quoting Letter from James McHenry,
Sec'y of War, to President Adams (May 18, 1798)).
68. See CUIuuE, supra note 62, at 207-10.
6g. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 2o8-o9.
pi. Id. The United States would at the time have had to rely on British naval power to make
good on that tacit threat. See JOHN LEwIs GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 16-30 (2004).
72. See CURIuE, supra note 62, at 215-17.
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had such unilateral power or whether it belonged to Congress.73 Legal historian
David Currie points out the irony that the neutrality proclamation was met
with stronger and more immediate constitutional scrutiny and criticism than
was Monroe's threat. After all, Washington's action accorded with the
principle that only Congress, representing popular will, should be able to take
the country from the baseline state of peace to war, whereas Monroe's action
seemed (at least implicitly) to commit the country to a war that Congress had
not approved.74
Curiously (but for reasons offered below, perhaps not surprisingly), this
issue-whether there are constitutional limits on the President's power to
threaten war -has vanished almost completely from legal discussion, and that
evaporation occurred even before the dramatic post-war expansion in asserted
presidential power to make war. Just prior to World War II, political scientist
and presidential-powers theorist Edward Corwin remarked that "[o] f course, it
may be argued, and has in fact been argued many times, that the President is
under constitutional obligation not to incur the risk of war in the prosecution
of a diplomatic policy without first consulting Congress and getting its
consent."7 1 "[N]evertheless," he continued, "the supposed principle is clearly a
maxim of policy rather than a generalization from consistent practice."76 In his
1945 study World Policing and the Constitution, James Grafton Rogers noted:
[E]xamples of demonstrations on land and sea made for a variety of
purposes and under Presidents of varied temper and in different
political climates will suffice to make the point. The Commander-in-
Chief under the Constitution can display our military resources and
threaten their use whenever he thinks best. The weakness in the
diplomatic weapon is the possibility of dissidence at home which may
cast doubt on our serious intent. The danger of the weapon is war.7
73. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING
SAIL 59-82 (2oo6).
74. CURRIE, supra note 62, at 207-08 (comparing constitutional questions raised by the Monroe
Doctrine to those raised by the neutrality controversy).
75. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF
PRACTICE AND OPINION 249 (1940).
76. Id.
77. JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, NINE WARS AND A HUNDRED MILITARY
OPERATIONS, 1789-1945, at 84 (1945).
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At least since then, though, the importance to U.S. foreign policy of threatened
force has increased dramatically, while legal questions about it have receded
further from discussion.
There are several reasons why constitutional questions about threatened
force have dropped out of legal discussions. First, the more politically salient
debate about the President's unilateral power to use force has probably
swallowed up this seemingly secondary issue. As explained below, it is a
mistake to view threats as secondary in importance to uses of force?7 but they
do not command the same political attention and their impacts are harder to
measure. Second, the expansion of American power after World War II,
combined with the growth of peacetime military forces and a set of defense
alliance commitments (developments that are elaborated below) make at least
some threat of force much more common-in the case of defensive alliances
and some deterrent policies, virtually constant-and difficult to distinguish
from other forms of everyday diplomacy and security policy. 79 Besides, for
political and diplomatic reasons, Presidents rarely threaten war or intervention
without at least a little deliberate ambiguity. As historian Marc Trachtenberg
puts it: "It often makes sense . . . to muddy the waters a bit and avoid direct
threats . . . ."so Any legal lines one might try to draw (recall early attempts to
restrict the President's unilateral authority to alter the state of affairs along the
peacetime-wartime continuum) have become blurrier and blurrier.
In sum, if the constitutional power to threaten war ever posed a serious
legal controversy, it does so no more. As the following Section explains,
however, threats of war and armed force have during most of our history
become a greater and greater part of American grand strategy, defined here as
long-term policies for using the country's military and non-military power to
achieve national goals. The prominent role of threatened force in U.S. strategy
has become the focus of political scientists and other students of security
strategy and crisis bargaining-but constitutional study has not adjusted
accordingly."
78. See infra Section I.C.
79. See id.
so. Marc Trachtenberg, Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis, 21 SECURITY STUD. 3, 39 (2012).
81. Cf GRIFFIN, supra note II, at 59-98 (situating the development of the president's modem
constitutional war powers in the context of Cold War strategy).
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C. Threats ofForce and U.S. Grand Strategy
While the Korean and Vietnam Wars were generating intense study among
lawyers and legal scholars about constitutional authority to wage military
actions abroad, during that same period many scholars and strategists -from
political scientists, economists, and historians to statesmen and other
practitioners of international affairs - turned their focus to the role of
threatened force as an instrument of foreign policy. The United States was
building and sustaining a massive war-fighting apparatus, but its security
policy was not oriented primarily around waging or winning wars but around
deterring them and using the threat of war -including demonstrative military
actions - to advance U.S. security interests. It was the potential use of American
military might, not its direct application or engagement with the enemy, that
would do much of the heavy lifting. American military power would be used to
deter the Soviet Union and other hostile states from taking aggressive action. It
would be unsheathed to prompt them to back down over disputes. It would
reassure allies that they could depend on U.S. help in defending themselves.
All this required that American willingness to go to war be credible in the eyes
of adversaries and allies alike.
Much of the early Cold War study of threatened force concerned nuclear
strategy, and especially deterrence or escalation of nuclear war. Works by
Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and others not only studied but shaped the
strategy of nuclear threats, as well as how to use limited applications of force or
threats of force to pursue strategic interests in remote parts of the globe
without sparking massive conflagrations." As the strategic analyst Bernard
Brodie wrote in 1946: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military
establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to
avert them."3
Toward that end, U.S. government security and defense planners during
this time focused heavily on preserving and improving the credibility of U.S.
military threats-while the Soviet Union was doing likewise.4 The Truman
Administration developed a militarized version of containment strategy against
82. See, e.g., HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION (1965); HERMAN KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR
WAR (1960); Albert J. Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FOREIGN AFF. 211
(1959)-
83. Bernard Brodie, Implications for Military Policy, in THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON: ATOMIC POWER
AND WORLD ORDER 70, 76 (Bernard Brodie ed., 1946).
84. see JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 90 (rev. & expanded ed. 2oo5).
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the Soviet empire, emphasizing that stronger military capabilities were
necessary to prevent the Soviets from seizing the initiative and to resist its
aggressive probes: "[I]t is clear," according to NSC-68, the government
document which encapsulated that strategy, "that a substantial and rapid
building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy
intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination." 8s
The Eisenhower Administration's "New Look" policy and doctrine of
"massive retaliation" emphasized making Western collective security both
more effective and less costly by placing greater reliance on deterrent threats -
including threatened escalation to general or nuclear war. As Eisenhower's
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained, "there is no local defense
which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local
defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory
power."" As described in Evan Thomas's recent book, Ike's Bluff Eisenhower
managed to convince Soviet leaders that he was ready to use nuclear weapons
to check their advance in Europe and elsewhere8 7 In part due to concerns that
threats of massive retaliation might be insufficiently credible in Soviet eyes
(especially with respect to U.S. interests perceived as peripheral), the Kennedy
Administration in 1961 shifted toward a strategy of "flexible response," which
relied on the development of a wider spectrum of military options that could
quickly and efficiently deliver varying degrees of force in response to foreign
aggression." Throughout these periods, Presidents often resorted to discrete,
limited uses of force to demonstrate willingness to escalate. For example, in
85. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States
Objectives and Programs for National Security, NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL 55 (1950),
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/lo-
.pdf [hereinafter NSC-68].
86. John Foster Dulles, The Evolution ofForeign Policy, 30 DEP'T ST. BULL. 107, 1o8 (1954).
87. See generally EvAN THOMAS, IKE'S BLUFF: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SECRET BATTLE TO SAVE
THE WORLD (2012).
88. "The weakness of Dulles's 'massive retaliation' strategy of the 1950s," wrote Henry
Kissinger, "[was] that in a crisis it gave us only the choice between nuclear war and doing
nothing." HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 115 (1979). While such inherent
inflexibility reduced this strategy's credibility abroad (and therefore its coercive
effectiveness), the massive retaliation doctrine also stood in stark opposition to President
Kennedy's inaugural promises to "pay any price, . . . support any friend, [and] oppose any
foe" in defense of international liberty. GEORGE HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER:
U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 702 (2008). The Kennedy Administration's
adoption of the flexible response strategy can therefore be seen as both a practical and an
ideological response to the limitations of massive retaliation.
1648
123:1626 2014
THE POWER TO THREATEN WAR
1961 the Kennedy Administration (mostly successfully in the short-run)
deployed intervention-ready military forces immediately off the coast of the
Dominican Republic to compel its government's ouster.8 9 That same year, it
used military exercises and shows of force in ending the Berlin crisis. 90 And in
the winter and spring of 1965, the Johnson Administration unsuccessfully used
air strikes on North Vietnamese targets following the Tonkin Gulf incidents,
failing to deter what it viewed as further North Vietnamese aggression.91 The
point here is not the shifting details of U.S. strategy after World War II-
during this era of dramatic expansion in asserted presidential war powers - but
the central role of credible threats of war in it, as well as the interrelationship of
plans for using force and credible threats to do so.
Also during this period, the United States abandoned its long-standing
aversion to "entangling alliances,"92 and committed to a network of mutual
defense treaties with dependent allies. Besides the global collective security
arrangement enshrined in the U.N. Charter, the United States committed soon
after World War II to mutual defense pacts with, for example, groups of states
in Western Europe (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 93 and Asia (the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,94 as well as bilateral defense agreements
with the Republic of Korea,95 Japan,96 and the Republic of China,97 among
others).
8g. See Jerome N. Slater, The Dominican Republic, 1961-66, in BARRY M. BLECHMAN & STEPHEN
S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 289,
289-303 (1978).
go. See Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961, in BLECHMAN & KAPLAN, supra
note 89, at 343, 397-434.
gi. See William E. Simons, The Vietnam Intervention, 1964-65, in ALEXANDER L. GEORGE ET AL.,
THE LIMITS OF COERCIvE DIPLOMACY: LAOS, CUBA, VIETNAM 144, 195-200 (1971).
92. In his Farewell Address, President Washington famously warned against alliances with
major European powers. George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 173 (Henry S. Commager & Milton Cantor eds.,
Prentice Hall College Div. loth ed. 1988), and available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu
/18thcentury/washing.asp. President Jefferson did the same in his first inaugural address.
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (18o), reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 321 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat'1 Literature
and Art 1908), and available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l9thcentury/jefinaul.asp.
93. See GADDIS, supra note 84, at 70.
94. See ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN PoucY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 271 (1974).
95. See id. at 141-42.
96. See GADDIS, supra note 84, at 76-77.
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These alliance commitments were part of an effort to "extend" deterrence
of Communist bloc aggression far beyond America's own borders.9' "Extended
deterrence" was also critical to reassuring these U.S. allies that their security
needs would be met, in some instances to head off their own dangerous
rearmament. 99
Among the leading academic works on strategy of the 196os and 70s were
those of Thomas Schelling, who developed the theoretical framework of
coercion, arguing that rational states routinely use the threat of military force -
as well as the manipulation of an adversary's perceptions of future risks and
costs with military threats -as a significant component of their diplomacy.100
Schelling distinguished between deterrence (the use of threats to dissuade an
adversary from taking undesired action) and compellence (the use of threats to
persuade an adversary to behave a certain way), and he distinguished both
forms of coercion from brute force: "[B]rute force succeeds when it is used,
whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the
threat of damage .. . to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is
latent violence that can influence someone's choice .. . ."o
Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons then led the way in
taking a more empirical approach, reviewing case studies to draw insights
about the success and failure of U.S. coercive threats, analyzing contextual
variables and their effects on parties' reactions to threats during crises. Among
their goals was generating lessons informed by history for successful strategies
that combine diplomatic efforts with threats or demonstrations of force,
recognizing that the United States relied heavily on threatened force in
addressing security crises. Coercive diplomacy - if successful - offered ways to
do so with minimal actual application of military force.'
97. See GEORGE & SMOKE, supra note 94, at 271-72.
98. See id.
99. A common argument among political scientists is that a formal alliance relationship acts as a
commitment device. See, e.g., James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why Write Them Down?, 3 ANN.
REv. POL. SCI. 63 (2000).
1o. See THOMAs C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 92-125 (1966).
1o1. Id. at 3.
ioz. See Alexander L. George, The Development of Doctrine and Strategy, in GEORGE ET AL., supra
note 91, at 1, 18 ("In this strategy force plays a modest, and often an inconspicuous, role.
And, again, unlike the traditional military strategy, force and threats of force may become
part of a carrot and stick approach to the opponent.").
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One of the most influential studies that followed was Force Without War:
U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, a Brookings Institution study led by
Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan and published in 1978.103 They studied
"political use[s] of the armed forces," defined as actions by U.S. military forces
"as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be
prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation
without engaging in a continued contest of violence." 04
Blechman and Kaplan's work, including their large data set and collected
case studies, was important for showing the many ways that threatened force
could support U.S. security policy. Besides deterrence and compellence, threats
of force were used to reassure allies (thereby, for example, avoiding their own
drive toward militarization of policies or crises) and to induce third parties to
behave certain ways (such as contributing to diplomatic resolution of crises).
The record of success in relying on threatened force has been quite mixed, they
showed. Blechman and Kaplan's work, and that of others who built upon it
through the end of the Cold War and the period that has followed,o 5 helped
explain the factors that correlated with successful threats or demonstrations of
force without resort or escalation to war, especially the importance of credible
signals.'os
After the Cold War, U.S. grand strategy continued to rely on coercive
force- threatened force to deter or compel behavior by other actors. During the
1990s, the United States wielded coercive power with varied results against
rogue actors in many cases that, without the overlay of superpower enmities,
were considered secondary or peripheral, not vital, interests: Iraq, Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere. For analysts of U.S. national security policy, a
major puzzle was reconciling the fact that the United States possessed
overwhelming military superiority in raw terms over any rivals with its difficult
time during this era in compelling changes in their behavior. 07 One important
1o3. BLECHMAN & KAPLAN, supra note 89.
o4. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
105. Philip Zelikow updated Blechman and Kaplan's data set and analysis in 1984. See Philip D.
Zelikow, Force Without War, 1975-82, 7 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 29 (1984).
io6. See BLECHMAN & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 519-20.
107. See Barry M. Blechman & Tamara Cofman Wittes, Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of
Force in American Foreign Policy, 114 POL. SCI. Qi. 1-4 (1999). As Daniel Byman and I wrote
about that decade in our study of threats of force and American foreign policy:
U.S. conventional and nuclear forces dwarf those of any adversaries, and the U.S.
economy remains the largest and most robust in the world. Because of these
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factor that seemed to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. coercive threats
during this period was that many adversaries perceived the United States as
still afflicted with "Vietnam syndrome," unwilling to make good on its military
threats and see military operations through.10
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, major U.S. security challenges
have included non-state terrorist threats, the proliferation of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and rapidly changing power balances in
East Asia, and the United States has accordingly been reorienting but retaining
its strategic reliance on threatened force. The Bush Administration's
"preemption doctrine" was premised on the idea that some dangerous actors -
including terrorist organizations and some states seeking WMD arsenals -are
undeterrable, so the United States might have to strike them first rather than
waiting to be struck.'09 On one hand, this was a move away from reliance on
threatened force: "The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of
today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by
our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit" a reactive posture.n 0 Yet the
very enunciation of such a policy-that "[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively""' -was intended to persuade those adversaries and their
supporters to alter their policies that the United States regarded as
destabilizing and threatening.
Although the Obama Administration pulled back from this rhetoric and
placed greater emphasis on international institutions, it has continued to rely
overwhelming advantages, the United States can threaten any conceivable
adversary with little danger of a major defeat or even significant retaliation. Yet
coercion remains difficult. Despite the United States' lopsided edge in raw
strength, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by
the United States and its allies. In confrontations with Somali militants, Serb
nationalists, and an Iraqi dictator, the U.S. and allied record of coercion has been
mixed over recent years....
Despite its mixed record of success, however, coercion will remain a critical
element of U.S. foreign policy.
DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMics OF COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE LiMrTs OF MILITARY MIGHT 1 (2002).
108. Blechman & Wittes, supra note 107, at 27-28; see BYMAN & WAXMAN, supra note 107, at 142-
44.
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on threatened force as a key pillar of its strategy with regard to deterring
adversaries (such as aggressive Iranian moves), intervening in humanitarian
crises (as in Libya), and reassuring allies."2 With regard to East Asia, for
example, the credible threat of U.S. military force is a significant element of
U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North Korean aggression as well as
reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection, to avert a destabilizing arms
race." 3 In justifying possible military force against Syria in response to its
government's use of chemical weapons, President Obama emphasized the
credible threat of U.S. military action as necessary to dissuade states and
terrorist organizations from acquiring or using WMD."4
D. The Disconnect Between Constitutional Discourse and Strategy
There is a major disconnect between the decades of work by strategists and
political scientists on American security policy since the Second World War
and legal analysis and scholarship of constitutional war powers during that
period. Lawyers and strategists have been relying on not only distinct
languages but distinct logics of military force. When it comes to using U.S.
military power, students of law think in terms of "going to war" while students
of strategy focus on potential war and processes leading to it. These framings
manifest in differing theoretical starting points for considering how exercises
of U.S. military might affect war and peace, and they skew empirical insights
and resulting normative prescriptions about presidential power.
1. Lawyers'Misframing
Lawyers' focus on actual uses of force -especially engagements with enemy
military forces-as constitutionally salient, rather than including threats of
force in their understanding of modern presidential powers, tilts analysis
toward a one-dimensional strategic logic. It misses a more complex, multi-
112. National Security Strategy of the United States, WHITE HOUSE 22 (May 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-securitystrategy.pdf.
113. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: REDEFINING AMERICA'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 14 (2011); Jane Perlez, Cancellation
of Trip by Obama Plays to Doubts ofAsia Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.con/20i3/lo/o5/world/asia/with-obama-stuck-in-washington-china-leader-has-clear-path
-at-asia-conferences.html.
114. See Address to the Nation on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 615 (Sept.
10, 2013).
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dimensional and dynamic logic in which the credible will to use force is as
important as the capacity to do so.
As discussed above, early American constitutional thinkers and
practitioners generally wanted to slow down decisions to go to war with
institutional checks because they thought that would make war less likely. "To
invoke a more contemporary image," wrote John Hart Ely of their vision, "it
takes more than one key to launch a missile: It should take quite a number to
start a war."1 s They also viewed the exercise of military power as generally a
ratchet of hostilities, whereby as the intensity of authorized or deployed force
increased, so generally did the state of hostilities between the United States and
other parties move along a continuum from peace to war.n'
Echoes of this logic still reverberate in modern congressionalist legal
scholarship: the more flexibly the President can use military force, the more
likely it is that the United States will find itself in wars; better, therefore, to
clog decisions to make war with legislative checks.117 Modern presidentialist
legal scholars usually respond that rapid action is a virtue, not a vice, in
exercising military force."' Now that the United States is a superpower with
global interests and global security concerns, vesting discretion in the President
to take rapid military action -endowed as he is with what Alexander Hamilton
called "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch"" 9 -best protects American
interests. In either case the emphasis tends to be overwhelmingly placed on
actual military engagements with adversaries.
Strategists and many political scientists, by contrast, view some of the most
significant use of military power as starting well before armed forces clash-
and including important cases in which they never actually do. Coercive
115. ELY, supra note 8, at 4.
116. See SOFAER, supra note 62, at 154, 157, 165.
117. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 61, at 84, 87-88; Jules Lobel, The Relationship Between the
Process and Substance of the National Security Constitution, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 360, 366-74
(1990) (reviewing KOH, supra note 9); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in
Democracies at War, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 196 (2009) ("In any democratic regime,
accountability to political processes-both through elections and the divided authority of
the executive and the legislature- makes leaders reluctant to engage in foolhardy military
expeditions."). But see Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 23, at 2526 (recognizing the importance of
signaling in functional assessments of war powers allocations).
1a. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF ExEcuTIvE POWER FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON To GEORGE W. BUSH 401-02 (2009); Eugene V. Rostow, President,
Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 74o, 741 (1989).
aig. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
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diplomacy and strategies of threatened force, they recognize, often involve a set
of moves and counter-moves by opposing sides and third parties before or even
without the violent engagement of opposing forces. It is often the parties'
perceptions of anticipated actions and costs, not the actual carrying through of
violence, that have the greatest impact on the course of events and resolution or
escalation of crises. Instead of being a ratchet of escalating hostilities, the
flexing of military muscle can decrease as well as increase actual hostilities,
stabilize as well as inflame relations with rivals or enemies. Moreover, those
effects are determined not just by U.S. moves and countermoves but by
anticipation and responses of other parties to them. 2o
Indeed, as Schelling observed, strategies of brinksmanship operate by "the
deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely
control."'' This insight -that effective strategies of threatened force involve not
only great uncertainty about the adversary's responses but also sometimes
involve intentionally creating risk of inadvertent escalation" -poses a difficult
challenge for any effort to cabin legally the President's power to threaten force
in terms of likelihood of war or some standard of due care.'23
2. Lawyers' Selection Problems
Methodologically, a lawyerly focus on actual uses of force -a list of which
would then commonly be used to consider which ones were or were not
authorized by Congress-vastly undercounts the instances in which Presidents
wield U.S. military might. Some legal scholars already recognize that studying
actual uses of force risks ignoring instances in which the President
contemplated force but refrained from using it, whether because of political,
congressional, or other constraints."' The point here is a different one: that
some of the most significant (and, in many instances, successful) presidential
decisions to threaten force do not show up in legal studies of presidential war
powers that consider actual deployment or engagement of U.S. military forces
izo. See BYMAN &WAXMAN, supra note 107, at 37-44.
121. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 200 (1960) (emphasis added).
122. Schelling called this "the threat that leaves something to chance." Id. at 187-203
(capitalization altered).
123. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Henkin's view that, "[a]s a matter of
constitutional doctrine, ... one can declare with confidence that a President begins to exceed
his authority if he willfully or recklessly moves the nation towards war").
124. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 35, at 468.
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as the relevant data set. Moreover, some actual uses of force, whether
authorized by Congress or not, were preceded by threats of force; in some cases
these threats may have failed on their own to resolve the crisis, and in other
cases they may have precipitated escalation. To the extent that lawyers are
interested in understanding from historical practice what war powers the
political branches thought they possessed and how well that understanding
worked, they are excluding important cases.
Consider, as an illustration of this difference in methodological starting
point, that for the period of 1946-1975 (during which the exercise of unilateral
presidential war powers had its most rapid expansion), the Congressional
Research Service compilation of instances in which the United States has
conducted military operations abroad to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S.
interests - often relied upon by legal scholars studying war powers - lists only
twenty-three incidents."s For the same time period, the Blechman and Kaplan
study of political uses of force (usually threats accompanied by some
movement of military forces) - often relied upon by political scientists studying
U.S. security strategy- includes dozens more data-points, because its authors
divide up many military crises into several discrete policy decisions, because
many crises were resolved with threat-backed diplomacy, and because many
uses of force were preceded by overt or implicit threats of force."'
Among the most significant incidents studied by Blechman and Kaplan but
not included in the Congressional Research Service compilation are the 1958-
1959 and 1961 crises over Berlin and the 1973 Middle East War, during which
U.S. Presidents signaled threats of superpower war, and in the latter case
signaled particularly a willingness to resort to nuclear weapons.m Because the
Presidents did not in the end carry out these threats, these cases lack the sort of
125. See TORREON, supra note 34, at 11-12. Louis Fisher refers to the use of this list (and its prior
editions) "to show that presidents have resorted to force against other countries hundreds of
times with Congress neither declaring war nor authorizing military action," but Fisher
criticizes inclusion of many of these cases as weak historical precedent for that practice. See
Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1656 (2000).
126. They identify and study 215 incidents for that time period. See BLECHMAN & KAPLAN, supra
note 89, at 16. This study, while dated, is still relied upon heavily today by political
scientists. See, e.g., Todd S. Sechser, Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,
64 INT'L ORG. 627, 628 n.3 (2010) (drawing on this data set for its relative completeness).
127. Blechman and Kaplan cite the 1973 war as one of four cases during the period of their study
in which the United States wielded a nuclear threat against the Soviet Union. See BLECHMAN
& KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 47. In his study of nuclear threats and brinksmanship, Richard
Betts details these three incidents among others as "higher-risk" cases. See RICHARD K.
BETrs, NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND NuCLEAR BALANCE 82-131 (1987).
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authoritative legal justifications or reactions that accompany actual uses of
force. It is therefore difficult to assess definitively how the executive branch
and Congress understood the scope of the President's war powers in these
cases. Historical inquiry, however, would probably show the executive branch's
interpretation to be very broad, even to include full-scale war and even where
the main U.S. interest at stake was the very credibility of U.S. defense
commitments undergirding its grand strategy, not simply the interests specific
to divided Germany and the Middle East region. One might argue that because
the threatened military actions were never carried out in these cases, it is
impossible to know for sure if the President would have sought congressional
authorization or how Congress would have reacted to the use of force.
Nonetheless, it is easy to see that in crises like these a threat by the President to
use force, having put U.S. credibility on the line in addition to whatever other
foreign policy stakes were at issue, would have put Congress in a bind.
By focusing so narrowly on actual hostile engagements pitting U.S. and
enemy forces against each other - such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars - legal
scholars systematically exclude from their functional analysis of war powers
significant examples in which the President probably wielded broad unilateral
authority in successfully defusing crises. Including them still leaves room to
debate whether that unilateral authority was wielded in ways that precipitated
the crises in the first place, or whether a stronger role for congressional
consultation or authorization would have contributed to or detracted from the
likelihood of peaceful resolution - with powerful normative implications - but
it provides a much richer and more complete data set.
3. Lawyers' Mis-Assessment
Empirically, analysis of and insights gleaned from any particular incident-
which might then be used to evaluate the functional merits of presidential
powers -look very different if one focuses predominantly on the actual use of
force instead of considering also the role of threatened force. Take, for
example, the Cuban Missile Crisis-perhaps the Cold War's most dangerous
event. To the rare extent that they consider domestic legal issues of this crisis at
all, lawyers interested in the constitutionality of President Kennedy's actions
generally ask only whether he was empowered to initiate the naval quarantine
of Cuba, because that is the concrete military action Kennedy took that was
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readily observable and that resulted in actual engagement with Soviet forces or
vessels-as it happens, very minimal engagement."'
To strategists who study the crisis, however, the naval quarantine is not in
itself the key presidential action. After all, as Kennedy and his advisers realized,
a quarantine alone could not remove the missiles that were already in Cuba.
The most consequential presidential actions were threats of military or even
nuclear escalation, signaled through various means including putting U.S.
strategic bombers on highest alert.12 9 The quarantine itself was significant not
for its direct military effects but because of its communicative impact in
showing U.S. resolve. If one focuses, as lawyers often do, on presidential
military action that actually engaged the enemy in combat (or nearly did), it is
easy to dismiss this case as not very constitutionally significant. But if one
focuses instead on nuclear brinksmanship, as strategists and political scientists
often do, 30 the Cuban Missile Crisis is arguably the most significant historical
exercise of presidential powers to affect war and peace.
128. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 36, at 204. Prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, an October 3, 1962,
congressional Joint Resolution declared it the policy of the United States "to prevent by
whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in
Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to
any part of this hemisphere," and "to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally
supported military capability endangering the security of the United States." Joint
Resolution Expressing the Determination of the United States with Respect to the Situation
in Cuba, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
In some analyses of war power issues, the Justice Department has cited this as
authorization for military actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but without discussing the
scope of that authorization. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Authority to Permit
Incursion into Communist Sanctuaries in the Cambodia-Vietnam Border Area, U.S. DEP'T JUST.
315 (May 14, 1970), http://www.justice.gov/olc/197o/cambodia-1.pdf ("On some occasions
in our history, such as .. . the Cuban Missile Crisis, Congress has, in advance, authorized
military action by the President without declaring war."). But see Sanford Levinson & Jack
M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789,
1824-26 (2010) (arguing that Kennedy's ability to unilaterally take the country to nuclear
war in the Cuban Missile Crisis reveals the lack of checks on executive powers).
129. In his televised address to the nation, Kennedy also stated: "It shall be the policy of this
Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western
Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full
retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." President John F. Kennedy, Radio and
Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, 485 PUB.
PAPERS 8o6, 8o8 (Oct. 22, 1962).
130. See Richard E. Neustadt & Graham T. Allison, Afterword to ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN
DAYs: AMEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 134-36 (1971).
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Considering again the 1991 Iraq War, most legal scholars would view this
instance as constitutionally a pretty uncontroversial military conflict: the
President claimed unilateral authority to use force, but he eventually sought
and obtained congressional authorization for what was ultimately-at least in
the short run -a quite successful war.'3 ' For the most part, this case is therefore
neither celebrated nor decried much by either side of legal war powers
debates,'32 though some congressionalist scholars highlight the correlation of
congressional authorization for this war and a successful outcome.33 Political
scientists look at the case differently, though. They often study this event not
as a successful war but as failed coercive diplomacy, in that the United States
first threatened war through a set of dramatically escalating steps that
ultimately failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.134
Some political scientists even see U.S. legal debate about military actions as an
important part of this story, asserting that adversaries pay attention to
congressional arguments and moves in evaluating U.S. resolve (an issue taken
up in greater detail below) and that congressional opposition to Bush's initial
unilateralism in this case undermined the credibility of U.S. threats. 35 Whether
131. See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 109-10.
132. See Edward Keynes, The War Powers Resolution and the Persian Gulf War, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 241, 243 (David Gray Adler
& Larry N. George eds., 1996) (noting that the quick victory in this war "stifled ... debate"
about constitutional allocations of war powers).
133. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 3, at 68 ("[C]ongressional articulation of national interest [in
authorizing the 1991 Gulf War] provided authority and credibility not only for the 1991 war,
but also for the subsequent reminders to Saddam Hussein that U.S. military power can be
invoked to enforce compliance with international norms.").
134. See, e.g., Richard Herrmann, Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait, 1990-1991, in
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & WILLIAM E. SIMONS, THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 229,229-
54 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing the 1991 Gulf War as a failure of coercive diplomacy); Janice
Gross Stein, Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?, 17
INT'L SECURITY 147 (1992) (same).
135. See, e.g., DAvID P. AUERSWALD, DISARMED DEMOCRACIES: DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE
USE OF FORCE 91-97 (2000); see also Blechman & Wittes, supra note 107, at 13-14. 1 have seen
no good empirical evidence to support this claim, though; to the contrary, there is good
empirical evidence that the Iraqi government was very poor at reading American politics. See
generally Charles Duelfer & Stephen Benedict Dyson, Chronic Misperception and International
Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience, 36 INT'L SECURITY 73 (2i1). Some political scientists
speculate that, once the President had already sent significant forces to the region,
Congress's rejection of an authorization to use force might have increased the likelihood of
war. See James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense
Policy, BULL. AMER. ACAD. ARTS & Sci., Mar. 1994, at 7, 11.
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one sees the Gulf War as a case of successful war, as lawyers usually do, or
unsuccessful threatened war, as political scientists usually do, colors how one
evaluates the outcome and the credit one attaches to factors such as vocal
congressional opposition to initially unilateral presidential moves.
Notice also that legal analysis of presidential authority to use force is
sometimes thought to turn partly on the U.S. security interests at stake, as
though those interests are purely contextual and exogenous to U.S. decision-
making and grand strategy. In justifying President Obama's 2011 use of force
against the Libyan government, for example, the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel concluded that the President had such legal authority "because
he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national
interest," and it then went on to detail the U.S. security and foreign policy
interests.36
The interests at stake in crises like these, however, are altered dramatically
if the President threatens force. Doing so puts the credibility of U.S. threats at
stake, which is important not only with respect to resolving the crisis at hand
but with respect to other potential adversaries watching U.S. moves. 37 The
President's power to threaten force means that he may unilaterally alter the
costs and benefits of actually using force through his prior actions.13 Consider,
for example, that once President George H.W. Bush placed hundreds of
thousands of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region and issued an ultimatum to
136. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011).
137. Such reputation effects feature prominently in international relations deterrence and
coercion theory, see SCHELLING, supra note ioo, at 124, though firm understanding of how
reputations are created and how they function has lagged. See Robert Jervis, Deterrence and
Perception, 7 INT'L SECURITY 1, 8-9 (1982). U.S. political leaders and government policy-
makers place great emphasis on the importance of maintaining credibility of threats,
whereas some political scientists have called its importance into doubt. See Daniel Drezner,
Swing and a Miss, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 16, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles
/2013/o9/16/swing and.aniss credibility syria. Some scholars have argued that no strong
links exist between states' actions and their reputations for resoluteness. See JONATHAN
MERCER, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1-43 (1996); see also DARYL G. PRESS,
CALCULATING CREDIBILITY: How LEADERS ASSESS MILITARY THREATS (2007) (arguing,
based on empirical case studies from the Cold War, that backing down in a particular crisis
did not diminish credibility in later crises). For a discussion of this literature and its
relationship to constitutional war powers, see Ganesh Sitaraman, Credibility and War Powers,
127 HARv. L. REv. F. 123 (2014), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvoll2 7
.sitaraman.pdf.
138. Political scientists refer to this in economic terms as a "costly signal," or an action that
changes one's own payoffs for subsequent actions. See Robert F. Trager, Diplomatic Calculus
in Anarchy: How Communication Matters, 104AM. POL. Sc. REv. 347, 348 (2010).
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Saddam Hussein in 1990, the credibility of U.S. threats and assurances to
regional partners were put on the line;'39 or that in threatening force against
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic over the 1999 Kosovo crisis, President
Clinton and allied leaders altered the strategic stakes by putting perceptions
(among both allies and adversaries) of collective NATO resolve on the line. 4o
In other words, the U.S. security interests in carrying through on threats
are partly endogenous to the strategy embarked upon to address crises.
Moreover, interests at stake in any one crisis cannot simply be disaggregated
from broader U.S. grand strategy: If the United States generally relies heavily
on threats of force to shape the behavior of other actors, then its demonstrated
willingness or unwillingness to carry out a threat and the outcomes of that
action may affect its credibility in the eyes of other adversaries and allies, too.'14
It is remarkable, though in the end not surprising, that the executive
branch does not generally cite these credibility interests in justifying its
unilateral uses of force. It does cite when relevant the U.S. interest in
sustaining the credibility of its formal alliance commitments or U.N. Security
Council resolutions, as reasons supporting the President's constitutional
authority to use force.' The executive branch generally refrains from citing
139. See Glennon, supra note 61, at 93 (noting that the executive branch argued in the Dellums
litigation that American credibility would be undercut by judicial intervention, but arguing
that the executive had created this problem for itself).
140. See Henry A. Kissinger, Doing Injury to History, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1999, at 38.
141. See Robert J. Art, Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?, in THE UNITED STATES AND
COERCIvE DIPLOMACY 359, 408-09 (Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin eds., 2003).
142. Since the Korean War, the executive branch has frequently cited the importance of
maintaining the credibility of the U.N. system - especially through the enforcement of
Security Council resolutions -as an integral U.S. interest when justifying the use of force
internationally, and one closely linked to the President's foreign relations powers. See, e.g.,
Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 10 (2011) ("In our view, the
combination of at least two national interests that the President reasonably determined were
at stake here-preserving regional stability and supporting the UNSC's credibility and
effectiveness -provided a sufficient basis for the President's exercise of his constitutional
authority to order the use of military force."); Proposed Deployment of United States
Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. 327, 333 (1999) (making the same argument);
Authority of the President to Use United States Military Forces for Protection of the Relief
Effort in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 8, 12 (1992) ("Maintaining the credibility of United
Nations Security Council decisions, protecting the security of United Nations and related
relief efforts, and ensuring the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations can
be considered a vital national interest, and will promote the United States' conception of a
'new world order.'"); Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP'T ST. BuLL.
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the similar interests in sustaining the credibility of the President's own threats
of force, however, probably in part because doing so would so nakedly expose
the degree to which the President's prior unilateral strategic decisions would tie
Congress's hands on the matter.
In sum, lawyers' focus on actual uses of force-usually in terms of armed
clashes with an enemy or the placement of troops into hostile environments -
does not account for much vaster ways that Presidents wield U.S. military
power, and it skews the claims legal scholars make about the allocation of war
powers between the political branches. A more complete account of
constitutional war powers should incorporate the significant role of threatened
force in American foreign policy.
II. DEMOCRATIC CHECKS ON THREATENED FORCE
Thus far, this Article has shown that, especially since the end of World War
II, the United States has relied heavily on strategies of threatened force - for
which credible signals are a critical element-in wielding its military might,
and that the President is not constrained legally in any significant, formal sense
in threatening war. Drawing on recent political science scholarship, this Part
takes some of the major questions often asked by students of constitutional war
powers with respect to the actual use of force and reframes them in terms of
threatened force.
First, as a descriptive matter, in the absence of formal legal checks on the
President's power to threaten war, is the President nevertheless informally but
substantially constrained by democratic institutions and processes, and what
role does Congress play in that constraint? Second, as a normative matter,
what are the merits and drawbacks of this arrangement of democratic
institutions and constraints with regard to strategies of threatened force?
Third, as a prescriptive matter, since it is not really plausible that Congress or
courts would ever erect direct legal barriers to the President's power to threaten
war, how might legal reform proposals to more strongly and formally constrain
the President's power to use force indirectly impact his power to threaten it
effectively? For reasons discussed below, I do not consider whether Congress
173, 177 (1950) ("The continued existence of the United Nations as an effective international
organization is a paramount United States interest.").
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could legislatively restrict the President's power to threaten force or war; in
short, I set that issue aside because even if doing so were constitutionally
permissible, ardent congressionalists have exhibited no interest in doing so,
and instead have focused on legally controlling the actual use of force.
Political science insights that bear on these questions emerge from several
directions. One is from studies of Congress's influence on decisions to use
force, which usually assume that Congress's formal legislative powers play only
a limited role in this area, and the effects of this influence on presidential
decision-making about threatened force. Another is international relations
literature on bargaining, 43 as well as literature on the theory of democratic
peace, the notion that democracies rarely go to war with one another.'44 In
attempting to explain the near-absence of military conflicts between
democracies, political scientists have examined how particular features of
democratic governance - electoral accountability, the institutionalized
mobilization of political opponents, and the diffusion of decision-making
authority regarding the use of force among executive and legislative branches -
affect decision-making about war. 1s These and other studies, in turn, have led
some political scientists (especially those with a rational choice theory
orientation) to focus on how those features affect the credibility of signals
about force that governments send to adversaries in crises.14
My purpose in addressing these questions is to begin painting a more
complete and detailed picture of the way war powers operate, or could operate,
than one sees when looking only at actual wars and use of force. This is not
intended to be a comprehensive account, but is instead an effort to synthesize
143. See supra note 24.
144. For a summary of this literature, see David L. Rousseau et al., Assessing the Dyadic Nature of
the Democratic Peace, 1918-88, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 512 (1996).
145. I am focused here on rational-institutionalist approaches to democratic peace and
international relations, and the work derived from it, but there are other strands of
democratic peace theory that emphasize the importance of liberal norms. See Vesna
Danilovic & Joe Clare, The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited), 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 397 (2007);
Michael W. Doyle, Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 463 (2oos).
146. See KENNETH SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (2001) [hereinafter
SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY]; James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 577 (1994); Kenneth Schultz, Do Democratic
Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and
War, 53 INT'L ORG. 233 (1999); Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in
International Crises, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 829 (1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Domestic
Opposition]. Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo draw on this body of scholarship in their argument
about rational war and constitutional design. See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 23.
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some strands of scholarship from other fields regarding threatened force in
order to inform legal discourse about how war powers function in practice and
the strategic implications of reform.
The answers to these questions also bear on debates raging among legal
scholars on the nature of American executive power and its constraint by law.
Initially, they seem to support the views of those legal scholars who have long
believed that, in practice, law no longer seriously binds the President with
respect to war-making. 47 That view has been taken even further recently by
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who argue that "[1]aw does little to
constrain the modern executive" at all, but also observe that "politics and
public opinion" operate effectively to cabin executive powers.148 The arguments
offered here, however, support the position of those legal scholars who
describe a more complex relationship between law and politics, including that
law is constitutive of the processes of political struggle.149 That law helps
constitute the processes of political struggles is true of any area of public policy,
though, and what is special here is the added importance of foreign
audiences - including adversaries and allies alike - observing and reacting to
those politics, too.
A. Democratic Constraints on the Power to Threaten Force
At first blush, including the power to threaten war or force in our
understanding of how the President wields military might seems to suggest a
conception of presidential war powers even more expansive in scope and less
checked by other branches than often supposed, especially since the President
can by threatening force put the United States on a path to war that Congress
147. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline ofHistoy, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 377, 426 (2011) (reviewing Yoo, supra note 118; JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN
INSIDER'S AccouNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (20o6); and JOHN Yoo, THE POwERS OF WAR
AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)) ("[M]ost scholars
would agree that. . . advocacy of presidential preeminence in starting hostilities finds ample
precedent in post-Truman executive practice.").
148. ERic A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE ExEcuTIvE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN
REPUBLIC 15 (2010).
149. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1409 (2012) (reviewing
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 148); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 35, at 468
(discussing ways that Congress leverages its legal powers to shape politics on war
decisions); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 777,




THE POWER TO THREATEN WAR
will have difficulty resisting. That is partially true. But recent political science
scholarship reveals that democratic politics significantly constrain the
President's decisions to threaten force. It also shows that Congress plays an
important role in shaping those politics even in the absence of binding
legislative action.
Whereas most lawyers usually begin their analysis of the President's and
Congress's war powers by focusing on their formal legal authorities, political
scientists usually take for granted these days that the President is - in
practice -the dominant actor with respect to military crises and that Congress
wields its formal legislative powers in this area rarely or in only very limited
ways. A major school of thought, however, holds that members of Congress
nevertheless wield significant influence over decisions about force, and that
this influence extends to threatened force, so that Presidents generally refrain
from threats that would provoke strong congressional opposition. Even
without any serious prospect for legislatively blocking the President's intended
threats, Congress under certain conditions can loom large enough to force
Presidents to adjust their policies; even when it cannot, members of Congress
can oblige the President to expend much political capital. As Jon Pevehouse
and William Howell explain:
When members of Congress vocally oppose a use of force, they
undermine the president's ability to convince foreign states that he will
see a fight through to the end. Sensing hesitation on the part of the
United States, allies may be reluctant to contribute to a military
campaign, and adversaries are likely to fight harder and longer when
conflict erupts - thereby raising the costs of the military campaign,
decreasing the president's ability to negotiate a satisfactory resolution,
and increasing the probability that American lives are lost along the
way. Facing a limited band of allies willing to participate in a military
venture and an enemy emboldened by domestic critics, presidents may
choose to curtail, and even abandon, those military operations that do
not involve vital strategic interests.so
150. WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL
CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 223 (2007); see also DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE
RUBICON: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR 285 (2010) (noting
that "members of Congress have historically engaged in a variety of actions from formal
initiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding hearings that challenge the President's
conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate [about
military conflict]").
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This statement also highlights the important point, alluded to earlier, that
force and threatened force are not neatly separable categories. Limited uses of
force are often intended as signals of resolve to escalate, and most conflicts
involve bargaining in which the threat of future violence-rather than what
Schelling calls "brute force"s' -is used to try to extract concessions.
The formal participation of political opponents in legislative bodies
provides them with a forum for registering dissent to presidential policies of
force through such mechanisms as floor statements, committee oversight
hearings, resolution votes, and funding decisions.'52 These official actions
prevent the executive branch, even if it can be considered a unitary body, "from
monopolizing the nation's political discourse" on decisions regarding military
actions and can thereby make it difficult for the President to depart too far
from congressional preferences when weighing strategic choices about
threats.s 3 Members of the political opposition in Congress also have access to
resources for gathering policy-relevant information from the government that
informs their policy preferences. Their active participation in specialized
legislative committees similarly gives opponent party members access to fact-
finding resources and forums for registering informed dissent from decisions
within the committee's purview.54 As a result, legislative institutions within
democracies can enable political opponents to have a more immediate and
informed impact on the executive's decisions regarding force than can
opponents among the general public. Furthermore, studies suggest that
Congress can actively shape media coverage and public support for a
president's foreign policy engagements.'5s Under this logic, Presidents,
anticipating dissent, will be more selective in issuing threats in the first place,
making only those commitments that would not incite widespread political
opposition should the threat be carried through.ss
151. See supra note tot and accompanying text.
152. Some legal scholars emphasize these levers of congressional influence over war decisions,
too. See, e.g., REVELEY, supra note 39, at 133.
153. Cf SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY, supra note 146, at 57 (describing institutional mechanisms that
prevent monopolization of political discourse by any single government actor in a
democratic state).
154. See id. at 64.
155. William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress and the Use of Force, 59 INT'L
ORG. 209, 214 (2005).
156. This logic does not require opposition parties to be predisposed to oppose the use of force
systematically because of dovish preferences; it assumes only that opposition parties are
motivated by their desire to increase their electoral advantage over incumbents rather than
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Moreover, with regard to the signaling so critical to effective threats,
"Congress matters, and matters greatly[,] to a nation's ability to credibly
convey resolve to enemies and allies alike."'7 Political opponents within a
legislature have few electoral incentives to collude in an executive's bluff, and
they are capable of expressing opposition to a threatened use of force in ways
that could expose the bluff to a threatened adversary.5' This again narrows the
President's range of viable policy options for brandishing military force.
Having called for tougher action in Bosnia during the 1992 presidential
campaign, for instance, President Clinton delayed coercive military threats
against Serb forces once in office, due in part to congressional opposition and
infighting.'59
Counterintuitively, given the President's seemingly unlimited and
unchallenged constitutional power to threaten war, it may in some cases be
easier for members of Congress to influence presidential decisions to threaten
military action than presidential war decisions once U.S. forces are already
engaged in hostilities. It is widely believed that once U.S. armed forces are
fighting, congressmembers' hands are often tied: policy opposition at that
stage risks being portrayed as undermining our troops in the field.'6o Perhaps
the President takes this phenomenon into account and discounts political
by a particular preference on substantive matters. See SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY, supra note 146,
at 66-67, 72-73.
157. HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 150, at xi.
158. SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY, supra note 146, at 95-96.
159. See HOwELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 150, at 143; Ann Devroy & Daniel Williams, Clinton
Backs Balkan Action; Consultation with Hill Leaders Sparks Spirited Debate, WASH. POST, Apr.
28, 1993, at Al; Helen Dewar, Congress Torn over Balkan Role, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1993, at
Ai.
16o. See HOwELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 150, at xix ("The terms of debate shift the moment
that troops are put in harm's way, as the exigencies of protecting American lives drown out
many of the prior reservations raised about a military action. The domestic political world
changes . . . the instant that presidents formally decide to engage an enemy."); KOH, supra
note 9, at 133. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Mitchell v. Laird:
This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to
appropriate money or to draft men a Congressman is not necessarily approving of
the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act
refers to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement
and continuation might vote for the military appropriations and for the draft
measures because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already
fighting.
488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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opposition to threatened force, assuming that such opposition will dissipate if
he carries it through or announces his firm intention to do so. It is also likely
that actual use of force generally attracts much more interest in Congress than
threats of force, so members of Congress may be much less inclined to exercise
their influence when actual military action seems remote. These factors may
help explain how President Obama seemingly misjudged congressional
reluctance toward armed intervention in Syria when he called on Congress to
authorize strikes in August 2013.1" Nonetheless, well before a final decision-
point to use force occurs, members of Congress may communicate messages
domestically and convey signals abroad that the President will find difficult to
counter. 112
In some cases, Congress may communicate greater willingness than the
president to use force, such as through non-binding resolutions. For example,
in May 2013, the Senate, invoking constitutional war powers as its basis, passed
a resolution 99-0 calling for the United States to support Israel against Iran if
it were to take military action against Iran's nuclear weapons program.'6 > A
generation earlier, many members of Congress publicly opposed President
Jimmy Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan
directed at Communist China.164 Congress passed, despite the President's
161. See Peter Baker, Russian Proposal Could Offer Obama Escape from Bind, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept.
9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol3/o9/lo/world/middleeast/surprise-russian-proposal
-catches-obama-between-putin-and-house-republicans.html; Mark Landler & Jonathan
Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.con/2o13/o9/11/world/middleeast/syrian-chemical-arsenal.htrml.
162. On the other hand, perhaps the President would use public articulation of a threat as part of
an effort to build public support for an operation, and in that regard Congress's capacity to
constrain the President may be very uncertain.
163. See Timothy R. Homan, Senate Endorses Continuation of Sanctions Against Iran, BLOOMBERG,
May 22, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2o13-05-22/senate-endorses-continuation
-of-sanctions-against-iran.html. Some argued that this resolution would undermine the
Obama administration's diplomacy toward Iran. See Editorial, Congress Gets in the Way,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.cOm/2013/o3/o9/opinion/congress-gets
-in-the-way-on-iran.html.
164. Many members of Congress, including powerful Democratic senators, disputed the wisdom
of completely withdrawing the American defense commitment to Taiwan. See Robert G.
Kaiser, Woodcock Nomination Is Supported, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1979, at Al ("[M]any ...
members of Congress want[ed] to restore the impact if not the reality of the old U.S.-
Taiwan defense treaty."). Senators held up the confirmation of the new ambassador to
Beijing to force legislation restoring some aspects of the treaty commitment. Senate Panel
Backs Woodcock as Envoy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1979, at A13 (noting that Senator Church
pledged not to put the ambassador's nomination to a floor vote until the Taiwan legislation
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objections, the Taiwan Relations Act, which was in part intended to signal a
strong commitment to defend Taiwan.6 s Such efforts, in addition to showing
that the President and his agents do not completely control communication of
threats, put pressure on the President to act while also conveying to foreign
audiences a sturdy political foundation for threats the President may make
along those lines.
The upshot is that a body of recent political science, while confirming the
President's dominant position in setting policy in this area, also reveals that
policy-making with respect to threats of force is significantly shaped by
domestic politics and that Congress is institutionally positioned to play a
powerful role in influencing those politics, even without exercising its formal
legislative powers. The President's exercise of war powers -including powers
to threaten war - is not as unfettered as many assume.
B. Democratic Institutions and the Credibility of Threats
A central question among constitutional war powers scholars is whether
robust checks - especially congressional ones - on presidential use of force lead
to "sound" policy decision-making. Congressionalists typically argue that
legislative control over war decisions promotes more thorough and valuable
deliberation, including more accurate weighing of consequences and gauging
of political support for military action.'66 Presidentialists usually counter that
the executive branch has better information and therefore better ability to
was resolved). Other members of Congress brought suit against President Carter, albeit
unsuccessfully, to enjoin his termination of the treaty. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697,
709 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Wright, C.J., concurring in the result), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979).
165. Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b)( 4), 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3301(b)(4) (2012))
(declaring that any attack, boycott, or embargo on Taiwan would be "a threat to the peace
and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States"); id.
5 2(b)(5) (allowing the U.S. to provide arms "of a defensive character" to Taiwan); id.
§ 2(b)(6) (declaring that the U.S. "maintain[ed] the capacity ... to resist any resort to force
. . . [against] the people of Taiwan"); see also John H. Averill, Compromise on Taiwan
Reached, LA. TimES, Feb. 22, 1979, at Bi (quoting Republican Senator Javits's description of
the law as "the equivalent of the security blanket" the Mutual Defense Treaty had provided
Taiwan, and the statement of Assistant Secretary of State Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. that "[w]e
can live with it, but I'm not saying I'm happy with it"); Kaiser, supra note 164 ("An
administration official said last night, 'We still prefer no language, but now we face the
political reality that we're going to have something. We want it to be something that doesn't
disrupt the normalization process.'").
166. See ELY, supra note 8, at 3-5; see also Treanor, supra note 8, at 700.
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discern the dangers of action or inaction, and that quick and decisive military
moves are often required to deal with security crises.' 67
If we are interested in these sorts of functional arguments -and we should
be-then reframing the inquiry to include threatened force prompts critical
questions as to whether such checks also contribute to or detract from effective
deterrence and coercive diplomacy and therefore positively or negatively affect
the likelihood of achieving aims without resort to war. Here, recent political
science provides some reason for optimism, though the scholarship in this area
is neither well-developed nor conclusive.
To be sure, "soundness" of policy with respect to force is heavily laden with
normative assumptions about war and the appropriate role for the United
States in the broader international security system, so it is difficult to assess the
merits and disadvantages of constitutional allocations in the abstract. That
said, whatever their specific assumptions about appropriate uses of force,
constitutional war powers scholars usually evaluate the policy advantages and
dangers of decision-making allocations too narrowly in terms of the costs and
outcomes of actual military engagements with adversaries.
The importance of credibility to strategies of threatened force adds
important new dimensions to this debate. On the one hand, one might
intuitively expect that robust democratic checks would generally be ill-suited
for coercive threats and negotiations - that institutional centralization and
secrecy of decision-making might better equip non-democracies to wield
threats of force in support of foreign policy ambitions. As Quincy Wright
speculated in 1942, autocracies "can use war efficiently and threats of war even
more efficiently" than democracies,' 68 especially the American democracy in
which vocal public and congressional opposition may undermine threats.16 9
Moreover, proponents of democratic checks on war powers usually assume that
careful deliberation is a virtue in preventing unnecessary wars, but strategists
of deterrence and coercion observe that perceived irrationality is sometimes
important in conveying threats: "Don't test me, because I might just be crazy
enough to do it!"17o
167. See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 23, at 2522-25.
168. QUINCYWRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 847 (1942).
16q. See id. at 842.
170. See SCHELLING, supra note ioo, at 37 ("Another paradox of deterrence is that it does not
always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of
oneself or of one's country.").
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On the other hand, some political scientists have recently called this view
into question. They have concluded that the institutionalization of political
contestation and some diffusion of decision-making power in democracies of
the kind described in the previous Section make threats especially credible and
effective in resolving international crises without actual resort to armed
conflict. Recent arguments in effect turn some old claims about the strategic
disabilities of democracies on their heads: whereas it used to be generally
thought that democracies are ineffective in wielding threats because they are
poor at keeping secrets and their decision-making is constrained by internal
political pressures, a new wave of political science accepts this basic description
but argues that these democratic features are really strategic virtues. 71
Rationalist models of crisis bargaining between states assume that because
war is risky and costly, states will be better off if they can resolve their disputes
through bargaining rather than by enduring the costs and uncertainties of
armed conflict.'72 Effective bargaining during such disputes-that which
resolves the crisis without a resort to force-depends largely on states'
perceptions of their adversary's capacity to wage an effective military campaign
and its willingness to resort to force to obtain a favorable outcome. A state
targeted with a threat of force, for example, will be less willing to resist the
adversary's demands if it believes that the adversary intends to wage and is
capable of waging an effective military campaign to achieve its ends. If a state
perceives that the threat from the adversary is credible, that state has less
incentive to resist such demands if doing so will escalate into armed conflict.
The accuracy of such perceptions, however, is often compromised by
informational asymmetries that arise from private information about an
adversary's relative military capabilities and resolve that prevents states from
correctly assessing each other's intentions, as well as by the incentives states
have to misrepresent their willingness to fight-that is, to bluff.173
Informational asymmetries increase the potential for misperception and
17s. See Trachtenberg, supra note 8o, at 4; see also Issacharoff, supra note 117, at 197 (arguing that
democracies may have more credibility than non-democracies in signaling intentions during
crises, thereby helping to avoid inadvertent war). As noted below, Trachtenberg himself is
critical of much of such theory. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
172. See SCHULTz, DEMocRACY, supra note 146, at 24; James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations
for War, 49 INT'L ORG. 379, 380 (1995).
173. See Fearon, supra note 172, at 381; James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying
Hands Versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. CoNFLIcT RESOL. 68, 69 (1997); Schultz, Domestic
Opposition, supra note 146, at 829.
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thereby make war more likely; war, consequentially, can be thought of in these
cases as a "bargaining failure."' 74
Some political scientists have argued in recent decades -contrary to
previously common wisdom-that features and constraints of democracies
make them better suited than non-democracies to credibly signal their resolve
when they threaten force. To bolster their bargaining position, states will seek
to generate credible signals by making "hand-tying" commitments from which
leaders cannot back down without suffering considerable domestic political
costs.'s These domestic audience costs, according to some political scientists,
are especially high for leaders in democratic states, where they may bear them
at the polls."' Given the potentially high domestic political and electoral
repercussions democratic leaders face from backing down from a public threat,
they have significant incentives to refrain from bluffing. An adversary that
understands these political vulnerabilities is thereby more likely to perceive a
threat that a democratic leader does issue as highly credible, in turn making it
more likely that the adversary will yield.'7
Other scholars have recently pointed to the special role of legislative bodies
in signaling and threatening force. This is especially interesting from the
perspective of constitutional powers debates, because it posits a distinct role for
Congress -and, again, one that does not necessarily rely on Congress's ability
to pass binding legislation that formally confines the President.
Kenneth Schultz, for instance, argues that the open nature of competition
within democratic societies ensures that the interplay of opposing parties in
legislative bodies over the use of force is observable not just to their domestic
publics but to foreign actors; this inherent transparency within democracies -
magnified by legislative processes -provides more information to adversaries
regarding the unity of domestic opponents around a government's military and
174. SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY, supra note 146, at 24.
175. See Schultz, Domestic Opposition, supra note 146, at 829-30.
176. Fearon, supra note 146, at 577, 581-82. Nondemocratic regimes are not impervious to
audience costs themselves; popular dissatisfaction with a leader's decision can be expressed
through less formalized mechanisms for accountability with potentially more devastating
consequences, such as popular overthrow through revolution, a military coup, or
assassination. See SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY, supra note 146, at 14-15. Others dispute the notion
that democracies have any significant signaling advantage over most autocracies. See Jessica
L. Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve, 62 INT'L ORG. 35, 35
(20o8). Audience cost theory, however, is subject to much dispute. See infra notes 181-184
and accompanying text.
177. See Fearon, supra note 146, at 585-86.
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foreign policy decisions.'18 Political opposition parties can undermine the
credibility of some threats by the President to use force if they publicly voice
their opposition in committee hearings, public statements, or through other
institutional mechanisms. Furthermore, legislative processes-such as debates
and hearings-make it difficult to conceal or misrepresent preferences about
war and peace.
Faced with such institutional constraints, Presidents will incline to be more
selective about making such threats and avoid being undermined in that
way.'79 This restraining effect on the ability of governments to issue threats in
turn makes those threats that the government does issue more credible because
observers will likely assume that the President would not issue it if he
anticipated strong political opposition. Especially when legislative members of
the opposition party publicly support an executive's threat to use force during a
crisis, their visible support lends additional credibility to the government's
threat by confirming that domestic political conditions favor the use of force
should it be necessary. Ao
The credibility-enhancing effects of legislative constraints on threats are
disputed. Some studies question the assumptions underpinning theories of
audience costs - specifically the idea that democratic leaders suffer domestic
political costs to failing to make good on their threats, and therefore that their
threats are especially credible"' -and others question whether the empirical
data support claims that democracies have credibility advantages in making
threats.8, Other scholars dispute the likelihood that leaders will really be
178. See SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY, supra note 146, at 6o; see also David P. Auerswald, Inward Bound:
Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts, 53 INT'L ORG. 469, 494-98 (1999) (detailing
congressional moves and some of their effects on coercive diplomacy during the Bosnian
crisis).
17g. See Schultz, Domestic Opposition, supra note 146, at 830.
iso. See id. ("[T]he opposition party can lend additional credibility to a government's threats by
publicly supporting those threats in a crisis.").
181. There has been some evidence offered from experimental settings suggesting that members
of the public would be willing to punish a leader for failing to follow through on threats -
even when the leader had strategically significant reasons for backing down-because they
worried that inconsistencies between threats and actions would weaken the country's
reputation and credibility in future crises. See Michael Tomz, Domestic Audience Costs in
International Relations: An Experimental Approach, 61 INT'L ORG. 821, 833-36 (2007).
182. See Alexander B. Downes & Todd S. Sechser, The Illusion of Democratic Credibility, 66 INT'L
ORG. 457, 474-83 (2012); Trachtenberg, supra note 80, at 3-32.
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punished politically for backing down, especially if the threat was not explicit
and unambiguous or if they have good policy reasons for doing so."I
Additionally, even if transparency in democratic institutions allows
domestic dissent from threats of force to be visible to foreign audiences, it is
not clear that adversaries interpret these mechanisms as political scientists
expect in their models of strategic interaction, in light of various common
problems of misperception in international relations.8 * These disputes are not
just between competing theoretical models but also over the links between any
of the models and real-world political behavior by states. At this point there
remains a dearth of good historical evidence as to how foreign leaders interpret
political maneuvers within Congress regarding threatened force.
Nevertheless, at the very least, strands of recent political science scholarship
cast significant doubt on the intuition that democratic checks are inherently
disadvantageous to strategies of threatened force. Quite the contrary, they
suggest that the types of legislative political checks discussed in the previous
Section- including the signaling functions that Congress is institutionally
situated to play with respect to foreign audiences interpreting U.S. government
moves -can be harnessed in some circumstances to support such strategies.
C. Legal Reform and Strategies of Threatened Force
Among legal scholars of war powers, the ultimate prescriptive question is
whether the President should be constrained more formally and strongly than
he currently is by legislative checks, especially a more robust and effective
mandatory legal requirement of congressional authorization to use force. Calls
for reform usually involve narrowing the circumstances in which congressional
authorization is not constitutionally required, tightening enforcement of these
purported requirements (by all three branches of government), or revising and
enforcing the War Powers Resolution or other framework legislation requiring
express congressional authorization for military actions.a5 Under these sorts of
183. Jack S. Levy, Coercive Threats, Audience Costs and Case Studies, 21 SEcURTY STUD. 383, 386
(2012); Jack Snyder & Erica D. Borghard, The Cost ofEmpty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,
105 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 437,439 (2011).
184. See Snyder & Borghard, supra note 183, at 44o-41; see also Jervis, supra note 137, at 8
("[S]cholars know remarkably little about how [judgments of credibility] are formed and
altered.").
iSs. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DECIDING TO USE FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS IN A
SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES (2005); ELY, supra note 8, at 115-31; FISHER, supra note 36,
at 261-81; Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 52; Glennon, supra note 61, at 99-oo; see also
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proposals, the President would often lack authority to unilaterally make good
on threats except in narrow circumstances (such as stopping imminent attacks
on the United States).
Whereas legal scholars are consumed with the internal effects of war
powers law, such as whether and when it constrains U.S. government decision-
making, the analysis contained in the previous Section shifts attention
externally to whether and when U.S. law might influence decision-making by
adversaries, allies, and other international actors. In prescriptive terms, if the
President's power to use force is linked to his ability to threaten it effectively,
then any consideration of war powers reform on policy outcomes and long-
term interests should include the important secondary effects on deterrent and
coercive strategies-and how U.S. legal doctrine is perceived and understood
abroad.'8 6 Would stronger legal requirements for congressional authorization
to use force reduce a president's opportunities for bluffing? If so, would such
requirements improve U.S. coercive diplomacy by making ensuing threats
more credible? Or would they undermine diplomacy by taking some threats
legally off the table as viable policy options? And would stronger formal
legislative powers with respect to force have significant marginal effects on the
signaling effects of dissent within Congress, beyond those already resulting
from open political discourse? These are difficult questions, but the analysis
and evidence above help generate some initial hypotheses and avenues for
further research and analysis.
One might ask at this point why, having exposed as a hole in war powers
legal discourse the tendency to overlook threatened force, this Article does not
take up whether Congress should assert some direct legislative control of
threats -perhaps statutorily limiting the President's authority to make them or
establishing procedural conditions like presidential reporting requirements to
Congress. This Article puts such a notion aside for two reasons. First, for
reasons alluded to above, such limits would be constitutionally suspect and
Leonard G. Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 476 (1971) ("The treaty-enforcing power of the President and
the war-declaring power of Congress are accommodated if the President may independently
deploy armed forces as a deterrent prior to hostilities . . . but must promptly request
congressional approval for American combat-when it impends, if possible, otherwise when
it begins.").
186. One of the few pieces of legal scholarship to engage in this sort of analysis is Nzelibe & Yoo,
supra note 23, at 2526-38 (arguing that credible signaling is an important element of rational
constitutional design of war powers). For a critique, see Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg,
Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J.
INT'LL. 1239 (20o6).
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difficult to enforce. 8 7 Second, even the most ardent congressionalists do not
contemplate such direct limits on the President's power to threaten. Direct
limits are therefore not a realistic option for reform. Instead, this Article
focuses on the more plausible-and much more discussed-possibility of
strengthening Congress's power over the ultimate decision whether to use
force, but augments the usual reform debate with appreciation for the
importance of credible threats.
A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that
stronger legislative checks on war powers could be harmful to coercive and
deterrent strategies, because they establish easily visible impediments to the
President's authority to follow through on threats: legal constraints trade off
with credibility. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers
Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and
outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration
of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force
would mean in practice that "no President could make a credible threat to use
force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive
confrontations."' He continued:
In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with
the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five
years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in
advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our
constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry
nuclear implications. ...
[I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under
the circumstance of modern life - the power to make a credible threat to
use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate. 189
In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed
these concerns, arguing that the law would undermine the credibility of U.S.
deterrent and coercive threats in the eyes of both adversaries and allies-they
187. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
188. Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 5o TEx. L. REV. 833, 838
(1972).
18g. Id. at 895-96; see also William P. Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59
CAUF. L. REV. 1194, 1210-11 (1971) (arguing that requirements of congressional
authorization to use force would undermine threats' necessary credibility).
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would know that presidential authority to use force would expire after sixty
days, so absent strong congressional support they could assume U.S.
withdrawal at that point."9 o
In short, those who oppose tying the president's hands with mandatory
congressional authorization requirements to use force sometimes argue that
doing so incidentally and dangerously ties his hands in threatening it. Their
position assumes that presidential flexibility to act militarily, preserved in legal
doctrine, enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate.
A second argument, this one advanced by some congressionalists, is that
stronger legislative checks on presidential uses of force would improve
deterrent and coercive strategies by making them more selective and credible.
The most credible U.S. threats, this argument holds, are those that carry
formal approval by Congress, which reflects strong public support and
willingness to bear the costs of war.'9 '
A frequently cited case for this claim is President Eisenhower's request
(soon granted) for standing congressional authorization to use force in the
Taiwan Strait Crises of the mid- and late-1950s -an authorization he claimed
at the time was important to bolstering the credibility of U.S. threats to protect
Formosa from Chinese aggression.' 92 "It was [Eisenhower's] seasoned
judgment . . . that a commitment by the United States would have much
greater impact on allies and enemies alike because it would represent the
collective judgment of the President and Congress," concludes Louis Fisher.
"Single-handed actions taken by a President, without the support of Congress
and the people, can threaten national prestige and undermine the presidency.
19o. See 119 CONG. REC. 34,990 (1973); see also Reisman, supra note 58, at 784-85 ("Trends in the
application of the War Powers Resolution may be viewed not only as communications to the
President but also as messages to adversaries that persistent resistance will be rewarded
rather quickly.").
191. See Damrosch, supra note 3, at 68; cf ELY, supra note 8, at 4-5 (arguing that congressional
authorization is a strong signal to enemies and allies of national resolve with respect to
conflicts); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DuKE L.J. 27, 94 (1991) ("[T]here is an
appealing rationale for why Congress's support for the use of force should be recorded in a
formal declaration of war: A credible threat of the sort found in the declaration of war on
Japan represents to America's enemy as well as to its own people that the United States is
willing to subordinate to the war effort all preferences for other public goods.").
192. FISHER, supra note 36, at 119. However, Eisenhower did not go so far as to suggest that
congressional authorization ought to be legally required. See id. If it had been evident to
China's leadership at the time that members of Congress were pressured to sign on to the
resolution for signaling purposes-rather than having done so out of a substantive
commitment to war - the resolution's strategic value might have been undermined.
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Eisenhower's position was sound then. It is sound now."'9 3 An important
assumption here is that legal requirements of congressional participation in
decisions to use force filter out unpopular uses of force, the threats of which are
unlikely to be credible and which, if unsuccessful, undermine the credibility of
future U.S. threats.
A third view is that legal clarity is important to U.S. coercive and deterrent
strategies; that ambiguity as to the President's powers to use force undermines
the credibility of threats. Michael Reisman observed in 1989, for example, that
ambiguity "in the allocation of competence and the uncertain congressional
role will sow uncertainty among those who depend on U.S. effectiveness for
security and the maintenance of world order. Some reduction in U.S.
credibility and diplomatic effectiveness may result." 94 Such stress on legal
clarity is common among lawyers, who usually regard it as important to
planning, whereas strategists tend to see possible value in "constructive
ambiguity," or deliberate fudging of drawn lines as a negotiating tactic or for
domestic political purposes.s95 A critical assumption here is that clarity of
constitutional or statutory design with respect to decisions about force exerts
significant effects on foreign perceptions of U.S. resolve to make good on
threats, if not by affecting the substance of U.S. policy commitments with
regard to force, then by pointing foreign actors to the appropriate institution or
process for reading them.
Political scientists almost never directly engage these questions of
constitutional design and reform (it is difficult, in fact, to find even passing
references to questions of legal doctrine or reform in political science
scholarship on threats of force). Partly this may reflect a general scholarly
disposition favoring descriptive over normative or prescriptive analysis - the
opposite of most American legal scholarship. Partly, though, it also reflects a
difference in emphasis between legal scholars and political scientists with
respect to democratic institutions. Whereas legal scholars tend to focus on
formal legal powers and checks - such as binding legislative control and
judicial review- political scientists focus on the political interactions that these
193. Id. at 124-25.
194. Reisman, supra note 58, at 784; see also Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart
Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1364, 1382 (1994) (book review) (discussing the prudential constitutional
argument that legal restrictions on presidential use of force may vitiate security guarantees
to allies).
195. See Trachtenberg, supra note 80, at 39.
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institutional arrangements facilitate.196 Political scientists tend to concentrate
on the legal allocation of powers between branches of government only to the
extent that such arrangements reinforce or provide a forum for political
contestation and competition among domestic political opponents. As a result,
they rarely examine how the sorts of constitutional and legislative reforms so
often put forward by legal thinkers would affect the credibility of threats.
That said, political science contributions in this area suggest that all three
of the views common among legal theorists probably contain some truth in
some cases, but also that all three are exaggerated. They are exaggerated to the
extent that they fail to account for the political checks imposed by Congress
that Presidents already internalize and that foreign actors already perceive; they
tend to consider formal legal checks in absolute terms rather than their
marginal effects relative to baseline politics, which operate quite robustly as
constraints. Furthermore, any reading of signals by foreign audiences would
have to take account of the possibility that a President might act outside the
law, especially in a grave national security crisis. On balance and in general,
though, the political science scholarship surveyed above suggests that a result
of stronger formal congressional checks on force would likely be restricted
reliance on threatened force, but at least some of the ensuing threats would
probably in turn be more credible.
Even if Congress already wields informal political influence over threatened
force, more potent and formal requirements of legislative force authorization or
stricter enforcement of existing ones would probably push U.S. policy toward a
narrower set of commitments and more reserved use of threats - a more
selective coercive and deterrent strategy-in several ways. For a President,
knowing that he requires legal authorization from Congress to follow through
on threats raises the expected political costs of making them (even very popular
ones would require spending some political capital to obtain formal legislative
backing). A more formal and substantial role for Congress in authorizing the
carrying out of threats would also probably amplify some of the informational
effects of executive-legislative dialogue and congressional debate described in
the previous Section: these processes -which could become more prominent if
they have greater legal significance - make it difficult to conceal or
196. Cf PAUL K. HUTH & TODD L. AILEE, THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 14 (2002) (discussing international relations scholarship's
emphasis on comparing democracies and non-democracies, rather than comparing types of
democracies).
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misrepresent preferences about war and peace, and therefore reduce
opportunities for bluffing.
If stronger legislative checks on war and force likely mean a more narrowly
selective policy of threatened force, then the previous Sections' analysis also
suggests -contrary to the common wisdom among presidentialists that tying
the executive's hands necessarily undermines the effectiveness of threats - that
the credibility of those select threats may in some cases be enhanced. Returning
to the Iran example with which this Article began, although a presidency that is
more legally constrained in using force would have less flexibility to dictate
U.S. actions, a President's decision to draw a red-line threat could send an even
more potent signal of resolve if legislation were ultimately required to carry it
out, because it might more clearly communicate projected inter-branch unity
behind the threat.
As the next Part will explain, whether more narrowly selective-but
perhaps more credible -threats would result in an overall improvement from a
policy standpoint depends on shifting geopolitical context and other balances
in U.S. strategy. The general point here is that the ultimate effects of any legal
reform on war and peace will depend not just on the internal effects on U.S.
government decision-making but the external perceptions of actors reading
U.S. signals.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWERS AND AMERICAN GRAND
STRATEGY
One broad implication of this analysis is that the true allocation of
constitutional war powers is-in anything but a formalistic sense-
geopolitically and strategically contingent. It is often believed that the power to
go to war is one of the most important constitutional powers because wars put
American blood and treasure at risk.'97 But even assuming as a normative
matter that this means that our constitutional law should be structured to be
war-averse,19' this principle does not provide as much guidance about legal
doctrine as often supposed unless integrated with ideas about how the United
States can and should pursue that agenda in relation to other actors pursuing
theirs and amid a changing international context.
197. See supra note 6.
198. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 117, at 374-81.
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A. Threats of War and Presidential Powers in Historical and Strategic Context
Thinking generally about the "powers of war and peace," the power to
decide to go to war was a much more significant one relative to the power to
threaten war-as well as other foreign relations powers-when the United
States was a small, militarily weak power, and when our strategy was avowedly
to stay out of foreign disputes, or when coercive diplomacy and deterrence that
extended to protecting distant allies abroad was not a serious strategic
option.1 99 If a major component of grand strategy is hiding behind
geographical barriers and avoiding conflict by not taking sides in disputes
among other powers -as it was during the infancy of the Republic and as it
was again in the interwar years -then the power to threaten war is not often
very consequential and an allocation of powers that makes it difficult to engage
in military conflicts or even threaten to do so is consistent with that strategic
vision.200 Note, too, that the lack of a very potent standing military force
during these periods limited options for coercive and deterrent strategies
anyway and made the President heavily dependent on Congress to furnish the
means to initiate them.2 '
Because the importance for the United States of threatened force -to coerce
or deter adversaries and to reassure allies -in affecting war and peace grew so
substantially after World War II, the constitutional decision-making about
using force has been relegated in large degree to a mechanism for
implementing grand strategy rather than setting it.2 o2 For a superpower that
199. See RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY, at xiv (1973).
2oo. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay) (arguing that a minimum level of military power
made war less likely through deterrence, rather than more likely); KOH, supra note 9, at 77
("America's geographical separation from the rest of the world ... figured ... prominently
in the development ofAmerica's constitutional traditions.").
2o. See ELY, supra note 8, at 7.
202. Of course, threats of force have played many roles in American foreign policy that are not
discussed here. For example, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the
United States practiced "gunboat diplomacy" as an instrument of power projection,
especially in Latin America and Asia. See KENNETH J. HAGAN, AMERICAN GUNBOAT
DIPLOMACY AND THE OLD NAVY 1877-1889, at 11o (1973) (documenting American gunboat
diplomacy in the late nineteenth century); KENNETH J. HAGAN, THIS PEOPLE'S NAVY: THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 235-41 (1991) (outlining the history of American gunboat
diplomacy and the related phenomenon of "naval imperialism" at the turn of the twentieth
century). A prominent theorist of gunboat diplomacy defines it as "any use or threat of
limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war . .. committed either in the furtherance
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plays a major role in sustaining global security, threatening war is in some
respects a much more policy-significant constitutional power than the power to
actually make war.
Moreover, the finctional benefits or dangers attendant to unilateral
presidential discretion to use force and to formulas for ensuring congressional
involvement cannot be separated from the means by which the United States
pursues its desired geopolitical ends. Those merits are inextricably linked to
substantive policy goals associated with its military capacity, such as whether
the United States is pursuing an aggressively expansionist agenda, a
territorially defensive one, a globally stabilizing one, or something else. They
also depend greatly on how the United States seeks to wield its military
power -as much its potential for armed force as its engagement of the enemy
with it- toward those ends.
B. Reframing "War Powers" Scholarship
One might object to the main point of this Article - that constitutional
allocations of power to use force cannot meaningfully be assessed either
descriptively or normatively without accounting for the way U.S. military
power is used - by arguing that it succumbs to its own critique. If the American
condition of war and peace is determined by more than just decisions to
commence hostilities or resist actual force with force, why stop at threats of
war and force? Why not extend the analysis even further, to include the many
other presidential powers-like diplomatic communication and recognition,
intelligence activities, negotiation, and so on-that could affect the course of
events in crises?203
This Article has focused on the way Presidents wield U.S. military force not
because analysis of those powers can be neatly separated from other ones or
decisions about war but to show how widening the lens even a little bit reveals
a much more complex interaction of law and strategy than often assumed in
war powers debates and opens up new avenues for analysis and possible
reform. Military force is also an important place to start because it has always
of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory of their own
state." JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY: POLmcAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL
FORCE 18 (1971).
203. As Taylor Reveley wrote introducing his treatise on constitutional war powers, "[t]he
breadth of policy pertinent to American war and peace ... runs from use of all possible
armed force through limited military measures to unarmed action (diplomatic, economic,
and the like)." REVELEY, supra note 39, at 14.
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carried special political and diplomatic salience.20 4 Moreover, many types of
non-military moves a President might take to communicate threats, such as
imposing economic sanctions or freezing financial assets,2 os rest on express
statutory delegations from Congress.2o^ Military threats, by contrast, often rest
primarily on the President's independent constitutional powers, perhaps
buttressed by implicit congressional assent, and therefore pose the most
fundamental questions of constitutional structure and power allocation in
relation to strategy.
A next step, though, would incorporate into this analysis other instruments
of statecraft, such as covert intervention or economic and financial actions -
recognizing that their legal regulation could similarly affect perceptions about
U.S. power abroad as well as the political and institutional incentives that
shape presidential decision-making. Moreover, sometimes coercive strategies
involve both carrots and sticks-threats as well as positive inducements 20 7 -
and Congress's powers may be dominant with regard to the latter elements of
that formula, perhaps in the form of spending on offered benefits or lifting of
economic sanctions.20s Further study might focus on such strategies and the
way they necessarily require inter-branch coordination, not only in carrying
out positive inducements but in credibly signaling an intention to do so.
At this point, many legal scholars reading this (yet another) Article on
constitutional war powers are bound to be disappointed that it proposes
neither a specific doctrinal reformulation nor offers an account of optimal
204. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
205. See David L. Asher et al., Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security,
CENTER FOR NEw AM. SECURITY 5-9 (2011), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents
/publications/CNASPressureAsherComrasCronin x.pdf.
206. The International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) grants the President broad
economic powers, including the authority to freeze assets and prohibit certain international
transactions. Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §5 1701-
1706 (20o6)). This general statutory power is supplemented with many specific statutory
delegations or mandates to the President with respect to particular threats or states. See, e.g.,
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. io8-
175, 117 Stat. 2482 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012)).
207. On the role of positive inducements in coercive diplomacy, see generally David A. Baldwin,
The Power of Positive Sanctions, 24 WORLD POL. 19 (1971). See also Jervis, supra note 5
(discussing the importance of positive inducements in resolving the Iranian nuclear
problem).
208. See, e.g., Megan K. Stack, Libya's Slow Trek Out of the Shadows, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2003,
http://articles.latimes.con/2oo3/dec/12/world/fg-libya2 (discussing the importance of
Congress's potential decision to lift sanctions against Libya).
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legal-power allocation to achieve desired results. One reason for that is that the
evidence surveyed in Part II is inconclusive with respect to some key questions,
especially with regard to how international credibility is earned and
maintained. Another, however, is that the very quest for optimal allocation of
these powers is generally misframed, because "optimal" only makes sense in
reference to some assumptions about strategy, which are not themselves fixed.
By tying notions of optimal legal allocations to strategy I do not simply mean
the basic point that we need prior agreement on desired ends (in the same
sense that economists talk about optimality by assuming goals of maximizing
social welfare), but the linking of means to ends. As the Article tries to show
throughout, even if one agrees that the desired ends are peace and security,
there are many strategies to achieve it -isolation, preventive war, deterrence,
and others -and variations among them, depending on prevailing geopolitical
conditions.
A more productive mode of study, then, recognizes the interdependence of
the allocation of war-related powers and the setting of grand strategy. Legal
powers and institutions enable or constrain strategies, and they also provide
the various actors in our constitutional system with levers for shaping those
strategies. At the same time, some strategies either reinforce or destabilize legal
designs.
C. Threats, Grand Strategy, and Future Executive-Congressional Balances
Having homed in here on threatened war or force, this Article might
suggest to some yet another indication of expanding or constitutionally
"imperial" power of the U.S. President. That is, beyond the President's wide
latitude to use military force abroad, he can take threatening steps that could
provoke or prevent war and even alter unilaterally the national interests at stake
in a crisis by placing U.S. credibility on the line - the President's powers of war
and peace are therefore even more expansive than already generally supposed.
It is also important to see this analysis, however, as showing a more
complex dependency of presidential powers on Congress with respect to
setting and sustaining American grand strategy. Philip Bobbitt was quite
correct when he decried lawyers' undue emphasis on the Declare War Clause
and the commencement of armed hostilities as the critical legal events in
thinking about constitutional allocations and U.S. security policy:
Wars rarely start as unexpected ambushes; they are usually the
culmination of a long period of policy decisions.... If we think of the
declaration of war as a commencing act-which it almost never is and
which the Framers did not expect it to be -we will not scrutinize those
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steps that bring us to war, steps that are in the main statutory in nature.
Moreover, we will be inclined to pretend .. . that Congress really has
played no role in formulating and funding very specific foreign and
security policies.20
The foreign and security policies to which Bobbitt refers include coercive and
deterrent strategies.
Indeed, it is important to remember that the heavy reliance on threatened
force, especially after World War II, has itself been a strategic choice by the
United States - not a predestined one - and one that could only be made and
continued with sustained congressional support. Since the beginning of the
Cold War period, the reliance on deterrence and coercive diplomacy became so
deeply ingrained in U.S. foreign policy that it is easy to forget that the United
States had other strategic options open to it. One option was war. Some senior
policy-makers during the early phases of the Cold War believed that conflict
with the Soviet Union was inevitable, so better to seize the initiative and strike
while the United States held some advantages in the balance of strength.2"o
Another option was isolation. The United States could have retracted its
security commitments to its own borders or hemisphere, as it did after World
War I, ceding influence to the Soviet bloc or other political forces. 2 1 These may
have been very bad alternatives, but they were real ones and were rejected in
favor of a combination of standing threats of force and discrete threats of
force - sometimes followed up with demonstrative uses of force - that was only
possible with congressional buy-in. That buy-in came in the form of military
funding for the standing forces and foreign deployments needed to maintain
the credibility of U.S. threats, as well as in Senate support for defense pacts
with allies.12 While a strategy of deterrent and coercive force has involved
significant unilateral discretion as to how and when specifically to threaten
military action in specific crises and incidents, the overall strategy rested on a
foundation of executive-congressional collaboration and dialogue that played
out over decades.
20g. Bobbitt, supra note 194, at 1386.
210. See MARc TRACHTENBERG, THE COLD WAR AND AFTER: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE LOGIC
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 252-53 (2012).
211. These options are outlined in NSC-68, supra note 85, at 44.
212. Cf supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text (discussing various ways in which Congress
can affect the credibility of U.S. threats).
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Looking to the future, the importance of threatened force relative to other
foreign policy instruments will inevitably shift again-and so, therefore, will
the balance of powers between the President and Congress. U.S. grand strategy
in the coming decades will be shaped by conditions of fiscal austerity and war
weariness, for example, which may mean cutting back on some security
commitments or reorienting doctrine for defending them toward greater
reliance on less-expensive means (such as, perhaps, a shift from large-scale
military forces to smaller ones, or greater reliance on high-technology, or even
revised doctrines of nuclear deterrence). 13
One possible geostrategic outlook is that the United States will retain its
singular military supremacy, and that it will continue to play a global policing
role. Another outlook, though, is that U.S. military dominance will be eclipsed
by other rising powers and diminished U.S. resources, political will, and
influence. 14 The latter scenario might mean that international relations will be
less influenced by credible threats of U.S. intervention, and perhaps more so by
the actions of regional powers and political bodies, or by institutions of global
governance like the U.N. Security Council.215 These possibilities could entail a
practical rebalancing of powers wielded by each branch of government,
including the power to threaten force and other foreign policy tools.
Were the United States to retreat from underwriting its allies' security and
some elements of the global order with strong coercive and deterrent threats,
one should expect different patterns of executive-congressional behavior with
respect to threatening and using force, because wars and threats of wars will
come about in different ways: less often as a breakdown of U.S. hegemonic
commitments, for example. A hypothesis for further consideration is that
reduced requirements of maintaining credible U.S. threats would also likely
reduce pressure on the President to protect prerogatives to threaten force and
to make good on those threats. A foreign policy strategy of more selective and
reserved military engagement may be one more accommodating to case-by-
213. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Strategy in a Time of Austerity: Why the Pentagon Should
Focus on Assuring Access, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2012, at 58; Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,




214. See Robert Kagan, Why the World Needs America, WALL ST. J., Feb. n1, 2012, http://online
.wsj.con/news/articles/SB0ooox4240529702o3646004577213262856669448
215. See CHARLES A. KuPcHAN, No ONE'S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, AND THE
COMING GLOBAL TURN 182-86 (2012).
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case, joint executive-legislative deliberation as to the threat or use of U.S.
military might, insofar as U.S. strategy would self-consciously avoid
cultivating foreign reliance on U.S. power.
Besides shifting geostrategic visions, ranging from a global policing role to
receding commitments, the set of tools available to Presidents for projecting
power will evolve, too, as will the nature of security threats, and this will
produce readjustments of the relative importance of constitutional powers and
inter-branch relations. Transnational terrorist threats, for example, are
sometimes thought to be impervious to deterrent threats, whether because they
may hold nihilistic agendas or lack tangible assets that can be held at risk."1
Technologies like unmanned weapon systems may make possible the
application of military violence with fewer risks and less public visibility than
in the past. 17 M While discussion of these developments as revolutionary is in
vogue, they are more evolutionary and incremental; their purported effects are
matters of degree. Such developments will, however, retune strategies for
brandishing and exercising military capabilities and the politics of using them.
As an initial hypothesis, these factors may reduce the influence of congressional
politics on the President's strategic decision-making if he views foreign
perceptions of American public resolve as less important to successful military
strategies.
Whatever the future of U.S. power, my analysis points toward a revised
agenda for thinking about war powers and their reform. If legal discourse of
war powers is too narrowly focused on actual wars and forceful military
engagements to the exclusion of threats of them, then so too is discussion of
reforms too narrowly focused on congressional involvement at the end stages
of coercive diplomacy-often long after threats have been issued and
responded to, positively or negatively - rather than at earlier ones.
A more productive reform agenda (and by no means a mutually exclusive
one) would focus on strengthening Congress's role in shaping U.S. grand
strategy more broadly. Rather than devoting its institutional energy to
reasserting its control over decisions to engage the enemy with military force in
particular circumstances, Congress would work to engage the executive branch
more seriously and continually with regard to the general policy circumstances
216. See AUSTIN LONG, DETERRENCE: FROM COLD WAR TO LONG WAR: LESSONS FROM Six
DECADES OF RAND RESEARCH 80 (2008).
217. See Peter W. Singer, Opinion, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o2/oi/22/opinion/sunday/do-drones-underniine
-democracy.html.
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under which force might be contemplated. This would require Congress to do
something it is not disposed to do, namely, use its other powers-such as
hearings, control of funds, and statutory delegations of bounded policy
discretion-to engage the executive branch on strategic questions about the
way force may be wielded in advance of, or at the earliest stages of, crises.
Proposals to restructure congressional national security committees include the
idea of creating more consolidated, joint House-Senate national security
committees, which would have greater leverage, expertise, and oversight
responsibility and which would tie together the elements of U.S. power more
effectively."' These proposals should be viewed not simply as means for
Congress to consult with the Executive once large-scale military intervention is
imminent, but also as mechanisms enabling Congress to coordinate with the
Executive on the matching of foreign policy means and ends well in advance
of crises.
Knowledge of how states acquire, maintain, or lose credibility to use force
remains severely limited, despite the intense emphasis on this subject in
discussions of American strategy.21 9 A research agenda for constitutional
scholars and political scientists alike could more thoroughly explore links
between different internal legal arrangements within democracies and different
strategies for using military power.220 Among other major questions, for
instance, is whether clear legal rules or predictable and transparent decision-
making processes -while constraining- can mitigate the endemic problems of
misperception in international affairs that sometimes contribute to violent
escalation of crises or undermine the credibility and potency of threats."
Moreover, these coercive or deterrent threats occur within a complex
international legal and diplomatic system, including the U.N. Security Council
and alliance or coalition relationships, so such analysis should consider the
overlapping effects of doctrine and processes of the domestic and international
regimes.m2
218. See KOH, supra note 9, at 167-68; MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, NATIONAL WAR PowERS
COMMIssION REPORT 36-37 (2oo8).
219. See supra Section II.B.
220. Cf Tom Ginsburg, War and Constitutional Design (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Working Paper,
2013) (on file with author) (drawing on political science scholarship to analyze which
democratic institutions and aspects of constitutional design affect war-making).
221. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing chronic problems of misperception in
international crisis diplomacy); see also Duelfer & Dyson, supra note 135 (detailing mutual
U.S. and Iraqi leadership misperceptions leading up to the 2003 Iraq War).
222. Cf Waxman, supra note 17, at 184-86 (outlining a research agenda relating international
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From a comparative perspective, the different roles played in the
international security system by the United States and its allies in Western
Europe might help explain why the United States government places so much
power over force decisions in the executive while its democratic allies have
generally moved toward greater parliamentary control.23 The credible threat of
their own military intervention plays a less significant role in the foreign and
security policy of many American allies (and they generally expect to use
significant force only as part of a broad coalition of partners including the
United States).2 This difference in strategic reliance on credible threats may
help explain why many democratic allies incline toward different constitutional
divisions of power than the United States.
Looking internally, a question for future study of interest to both political
scientists and legal scholars is whether Congress is as institutionally suited or
inclined as the executive branch to consider the credibility effects of threatened
or actual military actions in one case on other or future cases."s In other words,
an important issue when considering war powers reform is Congress's capacity
and desire to take account of and give substantial weight to the signals it sends
to other international actors with grants or denials of authorization to use
force.2 A related question is whether Congress's inclinations with regard to
credibility effects would shift were it to assume a more significant and
sustained formal role in decision-making about war and force - that is, whether
legal doctrine regulating force to the credibility of deterrent threats).
223. Lori Damrosch argues that this general trend toward parliamentary checks among other
democracies reflects commitment to certain normative values, notably democratic
accountability. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common
Core ofAccountability in Democratic Societies?, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 183 (1995). My point
here is that security strategy, and how a state wields or does not wield military force, may
have much to do with this trend.
224. See Sebastian Rosato, Europe's Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project, 35
INT'L SECURITY 45, 71-72 (2011) (discussing the European Union's inability to develop a
credible integrated defense community); James Blitz, NATO Chief Warns on Europe's Gaps
in Mali, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/bid56foa-6eo 7-ile2- 983d
-ooi44feab49a.html (discussing shortfalls in European allies' military capabilities exposed
by their Libya and Mali interventions).
225. A complicating factor mentioned earlier is that the U.S. Congress (or blocs of it) sometimes
tries to push the President to adopt a more hardline stance or to send its own threatening
signals independent of the executive branch. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
226. As discussed above, some political scientists have recently called into question the
reputational effects of military action in one crisis on perceptions of American resolve in
other crises. See supra note 137.
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any such congressional policy biases are structurally inherent or a function of
reigning legal doctrine.
In a hypothetical world of very stringent congressional force authorization
requirements, congressional practice might shift toward more common
reliance on standing authorizations regarding specific threats or categories of
threats, rather than the customary practice of specific authorizations usually
based on presidential requests during crises or after military operations begin.
Especially if presidentialists are correct to view flexibility as critical to
credibility, Congress might under such legal circumstances be inclined to
authorize some wide discretion back to the President. Any analysis of
substantial legal and institutional reform must consider not only whether
Congress would play a more significant role but perhaps also changes in the
typical form of its legislative involvement.
Finally, this analysis could be extended further by disaggregating types of
threatened force. This Article groups together many types of threatened force-
to deter aggression, to compel compliance with U.S. demands, to reassure
allies, and so on-in making a set of general points about constitutional power
allocations and strategy. Further inquiry could examine how domestic legal
constraints on force enhance or inhibit particular categories of threats. For
example, research could explore whether the credibility effects of legal
processes vary with different types of audiences (adversaries versus allies, or
closed political systems versus other democracies), or whether some particular
strategies-such as extending U.S. security guarantees to allies against
contemporary threats-require more or less presidential legal flexibility to be
effective.2 7 Such examination would be useful in understanding how future
directions of U.S. strategy or shifts in geopolitics may influence, or should
influence, inter-branch divisions of power over decisions about force.
CONCLUSION
It is often said that our eighteenth-century Constitution is ill-suited for
twentieth-century (and now twenty-first-century) threats."" This Article
227. Philip Bobbitt, for example, argues that Cold War extended deterrence, in particular,
required vast unilateral executive authority to be effective. See Philip Bobbitt, The Power to
Make War in an Age of Global Terror, HOOVER INST. 7-8 (2010), http://media.hoover.org
/sites/default/files/documents/PutureChallengesBobbitt.pdf.
228. See J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 2oth Centuty Under an 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1 (1961); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
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shows that changing threats are only half the story, and that the other half has
been evolving strategy for confronting them.
Lawyers think "war powers" are about making war or conducting military
operations. They therefore examine wars and military operations to describe
how war powers are exercised, and they defend various interpretations of these
powers with functional arguments about how best to wage war or military
operations. However, a major component of American strategy has long been
and remains the threat of war or military intervention. Expanding analysis of
war powers to include the important role of credible threats, and incorporating
insights from the political science of threatened force, reveals weaknesses in the
orthodoxies of both presidentialists and congressionalists, and it forms the
basis for a much richer understanding of the interrelationship of constitutional
law and grand strategy.
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